The Wajin’s Whiteness:
Law and Race Privilege in Japan

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Zainichi is the basis of my existence. When you take the broadest sense of the
word, which literally means “being in Japan,” even the Japanese are zainichi.
But they take it for granted that they live in Japan. So zainichi is a word that
has no meaning for them. This makes them Japanese.

Between those like us who have to be conscious of the fact that they are living
in Japan and those who take it for granted, there is a huge gap. . . .

To act is to be committed, and to be committed is to be in danger. In this case,
the danger, in the minds of most white Americans, is the loss of their identity.

1. Opening Thoughts

“Legal Realism,” “Law and Economics,” “Law and Society,” “Law and
Empiricism” are all familiar approaches to understanding law developed from
legal scholarship in the United States in the 20th century. While the scholarship
and foundational documents from these disciplines began by looking locally
within the United States, scholars subsequently experimented with non-U.S.
data aiming to establish the universal validity of these various theories across
national, societal, and cultural boundaries. Over the past thirty years, American
law scholars also drew attention to the pervasive role of race in shaping the
development of law and legal processes in the United States. Their studies
highlighted the relevance of race beyond obvious fields such as civil rights,
constitutional, and criminal law. In time, this emerging doctrine became known
as Critical Race Theory, somewhat linked to the approach of Critical Studies
through both name and ideas.

1  This paper is dedicated to the late Professor Chris Kwando Iijima, whose powerful and moving voice
was silenced too soon. Sincere thanks also to Hokkaido University Professor Ichiro Ozaki for
translating this paper into Japanese for publication.

2  Shijong Kim, in DAVID SUZUKI AND KEIBO OIWA, THE OTHER JAPAN: VOICES BEYOND THE
MAINSTREAM 179 (1996).

3  JAMES BALDWIN, My Dungeon Shook: A Letter To My Nephew On The One Hundredth Anniversary
In this paper, I contend that Critical Race Theory, like Legal Realism and the “Law and” fields listed above, can be applied usefully in the Japanese law context. This application suggests a better understanding of the role of race in shaping Japanese law as well as a better understanding of the role of law in shaping racial and ethnic relations in Japanese society. Furthermore, such an “experiment” using Japan as a focus points to the wider applicability of the ideas of Critical Race Theory.

At the very outset, a few definitions and an introduction of my platform are necessary and I undertake that task in Part II. Part III introduces some key methods in Critical Race Theory and finds relevance in using these methods to understand race circumstances in Japan. Part IV concludes by considering the practical implications of my findings and suggests areas for promising future study.

2. Defining Terms and Conditions

Throughout this paper, I use a number of terms that are susceptible to multiple interpretations and understandings. Before going further, I will explain what I mean when I use race and related terms, as well as a term from the Ainu, “Wajin.” Further, because my approach to the ideas here are deeply and inevitably connected to my personal aspects, I also explain a bit of who I am and where I come from in approaching this study.

Race: Critical Race Theory and this paper reject the notion of race as a biological, physiological, or genetic categorization. This rejection of biological race is neither new nor limited to Critical Race Theorists, and can be traced back at least to the anthropologist Ashley Montagu’s pivotal work in the early 1940’s, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race. In the U.S. context, these ideas were developed further in Professors Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s important 1986 work, Racial Formation in The United States from the 1960s to 1980s. Accordingly, racial distinctions must be recognized as social constructions, i.e., the dynamic inventions of societies that vary from place to place and time to time.

Professor Ian Haney Lopez’s definition of race as “the historically contingent social systems of meaning that attach to elements of morphology and

5  Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in The United States From the 1960s to 1990s (2nd ed. 1994).
ancestry” captures the meaning of race as it will be used in this paper. While this phrasing incorporates key aspects of race, it may leave readers feeling at a loss for concreteness and boundaries. This is unavoidable because racial distinctions have never had concreteness or clear boundaries. They are shaped by societies at particular times, revised to suit later times, and sometimes even abandoned. Yet if race is so intangible, does it have any meaning at all?

The answer is most certainly yes. My approach uses a metaphor from natural science – weather clouds. These are also impossible to grasp, constantly in motion, and redefined over time and across physical space. Even though clouds lack concreteness or perfect static boundaries, one can look up and see their shapes at any given moment. Clouds have meaning particularly because they imply real consequences – it rains. This analogy also reveals why the observer’s position is crucial. Cloud shapes appear differently depending on where the observer stands and her interpretive inclinations. When some people get wet and others stay dry, those who get wet will likely be in the best position to know if it is raining. As it is in natural science with clouds and rain, so it is in social science with race and racism.

Several closely related concepts add complicating dimensions to our discussion.

Indigenousness perhaps deserves first mention. Indigenous peoples in modern nations often share the circumstances of subordination with other racially marginalized groups, but the elements of their subordination are profoundly different. Unique and compelling circumstances relating to indigenousness, such as claims to land and sovereignty, are well-recognized in academic doctrine (for example, the writings of Professor Wil Kymlika) and in both international and local law. As I have written elsewhere, the Sapporo District Court’s astute judgment in the 1997 Nibutani Dam Decision reflects a keen understanding of these matters. In contrast, as the late Professor Chris

7  See e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995).
8  Kayano v. Hokkaidō Expropriation Committee, 1598 HANREI JIHÔ 33, 938 HANREI TIMES 75 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Mar. 27, 1997) (Japan), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 394 (Mark A. Levin trans., 1999), (complete annotated translation). In this case concerning land expropriation for construction of a dam in the village of Nibutani in Eastern Hokkaido, the Court gave remarkable and powerful judicial recognition of the Ainu’s historical and present-day grievances. In both form and consequence, the Court ruled against the Ainu plaintiff’s because the dam was allowed to remain standing. But owing to the findings and doctrine apart from that final result, the case was resoundingly seen as a victory for the Ainu plaintiffs. See Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 419 (2001).
Iijima has written, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 flawed decision in Rice v. Cayetano offers a clear example of an unjust failure to understand the particular elements of indigenousness in the dynamics of racial subordination.

*Ethnicity and caste* are close counterparts to race, both of which sometimes work as surrogates for race in social systems. Typically, *ethnicity* relates to geographic heritage distinctions among peoples who have otherwise been racialized into a single group, while *caste* relates to subordinated groups within a society who lack apparent morphological differences from the surrounding majority. As with race, these boundaries constantly shift across time and place, so that some groups once viewed as racially separate may later or elsewhere be viewed as separated by ethnicity or caste without any change in the group’s actual makeup.

Discussions of race, ethnicity, nationality, and caste inevitably blur together to reflect the common dynamics of marginalization experienced by weaker minority groups of all four varieties. Although there are certainly differences in how subordination is carried out and how marginalization is experienced, this paper draws upon the commonality among these categories. And so for convenience, I will sometimes set aside those differences and address them using the singular term “race”.

**Racism**: Critical Race Theorists recognize that racism is both of the mind and of the material world. In a leading article, Professor Charles Lawrence defined racism as “a set of beliefs whereby we irrationally attach significance to something called race.” Lawrence’s work broke new ground in identifying not only “the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few people”.

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10 Chris K. Iijima, *Race Over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano*, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 91 (2000). Professor Iijima, describing the Rice decision as a case in which “majoritarian perspective and racial norms masquerade as neutral narrative,” carefully deconstructs the historical misrepresentations and omissions in the Court’s majority opinion. Id. at 98 – 103.

11 Moreover, *nationality* is very closely allied with ethnicity, but derives from the political boundaries of citizenship which define a legal status used by the nation-states in our world.

12 This points to Professor David Hollinger’s suggestion that U.S. writers should abandon the terms “race” and “ethnicity” for a new term, “ethno-racial blocs,” which “better reflects our understanding of the contingent and instrumental characteristics of the categories, [and] acknowledges that the groups traditionally called racial exist on a blurred continuum with those traditionally called ethnic.” DAVID HOLLINGER, *POST ETHNIC AMERICA* 39 (rev. 2000).

ignorant bigots,” but also racism’s ubiquitous character in the minds of well-intentioned persons.14

Professor Richard Delgado supplies another description, defining racism as a “means by which society allocates privilege, status, and wealth.”15 Delgado argues that, notwithstanding the painful implications of racist “images, words, attitudes, and scripts that convey the message that certain people are less worthy . . . than others”16, such a materialist focus is necessary for Critical Race Theory. As Delgado explains, political action should be anchored in a materialist approach because “race and racism are not things that would cease to exist if we stopped thinking about them.”17

While racism may be difficult to identify in all of its forms and mechanisms (visible and hidden), a few elements are clear.

First, racism is best understood by those who are its victims. Professor Mari Matsuda, who calls upon scholars to “look to the bottom,” reminds us that “those who lack material wealth or political power still have access to thought and language, and their development of those tools will differ from that of the more privileged.”18 (Or repeating my analogy above, those who get wet are usually in the best position to know when it is raining.)

Second, privileges will be enjoyed by persons in dominant groups regardless of whether those persons are intentionally or unintentionally engaged in active racist behavior. As Lawrence points out, when unconscious ideas and beliefs fuel material race-based inequities, it becomes harder for persons of good intent to see their own complicity in perpetuating objectionable racism. Similarly, “by focusing on the issue of individual racism rather than societal discrimination, [persons of good intent] can relieve themselves of any responsibility for wrongdoing.”19

In short, racism exists in both discourse and ideas and in material social systems. From either approach, racism comes to be seen as ordinary and

14 Id.
16 Id. at 2282.
17 Id. at 2284.
19 See Lawrence supra note 13.
universal. It represents the hierarchy of dominant groups over subordinated social groups and serves as the primary tool to accomplish the perpetuation of that hierarchy.

Wajin: Japan’s racial dynamics are fluid and complex. Competing notions of the nation and its people have created internal and external “others.” Although “race” has not always been the term used to define these boundaries, race or race counterparts (i.e., culture, ethnicity, and nationality) have been the principal operating mechanisms. As Professor Michael Wiener has written, the terms have varied, but the net result of an “essentialized identity which distinguishes the Japanese from other populations” has remained constant.

Weiner writes:

Although there have been divergencies in the representation of “Self”, expressed variously in terms of “race”, ethnicity or culture, all have been grounded in notions of an essentialized identity which distinguishes the Japanese from other populations. To a certain extent, recent conceptualizations of Japanese uniqueness reflect an attempt to avoid the genetic consequences of the Second World War. In the broadest sense, cultural determinants (religious values, language, patterns of social and economic organization), rather than genetic or physiological markers, have been deployed to signify the existence of an immutable and homogeneous Japanese identity. Within this literature, the Japanese present is transformed by an idealized past, heterogeneity ignored, and historical memory suppressed.20

This essentialized Japanese core that Weiner describes has no adequate name in most modern conversations about Japan.21 To speak simply of Japanese people or “the Japanese” fails because Japanese-ness simultaneously

20 MICHAEL WEINER, Introduction to JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY, XI, XII–XIII. (1997). This brief excerpt may leave Weiner’s argument unclear. Partly modeled on Nazi notions of the Aryan race, late-Imperial Japan’s national discourse included explicitly racist discussions — with the Yamato people (minzoku) as the essentialized Japanese social construction. This put Japanese apart from other Asians as well as non-Asians using biological race as the defining mechanism. As with Nazi eugenic practices (and sadly, similar discourse/practice in Anglo-American nations as well), this racist discourse was intertwined with practical action through eugenics.

Given this ugly history, Weiner explains that post-WWII discourse in Japan generally avoids “race” as the term for essentializing Japan/Japanese into a unique body, and instead draws upon ethnic or cultural surrogates “rather than genetic or physiological markers”. But the result nonetheless creates “an essentialized identity which distinguishes the Japanese from other populations.” Id.

21 See infra text at footnote 59.
includes and excludes many minority people living in Japan. Thus, for example, Ainu people are undeniably Japanese in the context of nationality, but they are not seen as Japanese when race, ethnicity, or culture are considered.22

Other phrasings are also unsatisfactory. I have heard some speak of “Japanese Japanese,” but this seems both circular and unclear. The pre-war notion of the Yamato race or Yamato people perhaps captures the group description correctly, but this usage calls up the legacy of extreme racism in imperial Japan and therefore distracts us from present day issues.

Although my proposal is not the only possible semantic solution, I support the use of the Ainu term Wajin to describe Japan’s mainstream ethno-racial majority. The term is not deprecatory in any manner and it roughly establishes the concept in mind.23 As with any racial identity, the boundaries must be imprecise and amorphous. But most readers, most of the time, will understand who is a Wajin and who is not. In that regard, the term is good enough and maybe as good as is possible.

Mark Levin: While it is unconventional to define oneself in a paper on Japanese law, Critical Race Theory writings suggest that the failure to do so in a paper on race would imply a lack of understanding of my role in racial dynamics. Certainly, I would be thoughtless to write this paper without realizing that I am White, a U.S. citizen, Jewish-American, male, heterosexual, able-bodied, educated, and (relatively) affluent in the U.S. and the world. Further, all, or nearly all, of these aspects of myself ordinarily result in high social standing and a degree of privilege (including race-based privilege). Accordingly, I want my readers to know that I have considered these issues. I might hope that my inquiries will define me at least as a well-intentioned person, but I know that my goodness has limits. I do not pretend that I can completely escape from even malicious race-based distinctions that my unconscious generates. Yet, I hope that my conscious mind will succeed, more often than not, in overriding the venoms of racism and cluelessness inside me. Further, I can not speak for anyone else, especially a marginalized person of color, but I look to marginalized persons in the U.S. and Japan as sources for insight and for comment on my work.

22 Discussions in this paper skip over the issue of people of mixed race or ethnicity, which further complicate any quest for definitions and boundaries.

23 “Yamatonchu,” used by Ryukyuan people, might do just as well. I select “Wajin” primarily owing to my familiarity with the term, but I also think it is more suitable since it is a Japanese language word with ancient etymological roots. (Thanks to Professor Robert Huey for this information.)
3. Two experiments in Critical Race Theory

A. Law’s Performance in the Construction of Race in Japan

As noted above, over the past several decades social scientists have created a new understanding of race as a social construction that lacks any inherent physiological or biological meaning. Critical Race Theorists first connected these discussions to our understanding of law by pointing to the explicit and implicit uses of race in case law jurisprudence.

Racial aspects of constitutional law or criminal law need no introduction, but racial elements hidden in seemingly “race-neutral” areas of law also are numerous. To mention only two: environmental justice scholars have identified racism in extraordinary disparities in the siting of adverse environmental perils unmistakably linked with differences in racial and class demographics.24 Similarly, when tax law is scrutinized closely, Professors Beverly Moran and William Whitford have illustrated numerous aspects of the Internal Revenue Code disadvantageous to racial minorities.25

Analogs of these dynamics, i.e., race as the driving force in the law’s development, are easily found in Japan. Race (or ethnicity or caste) has been the undercurrent of aspects of constitutional law (such as the voting rights of foreigners or the rights of the Ainu in the Nibutani Dam Decision26), civil law (e.g., the Anna Bortz decision27 in tort law and numerous family law cases), nationality laws, employment law (i.e., the absence of statutory discrimination laws), public accommodations law (e.g., the Otaru onsen case), the family registry law (as presented by Professor Tamie Bryant28), the Burakumin and judicial legitimization of instrumental violence (as presented by Professor Frank Upham29), and countless administrative policy determinations that accomplish

29 See FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN, CH. 3 (1987).
racial subordination such as environmental racism (e.g., siting of undesirable public works projects such as the Nibutani Dam). In public safety, education, and health administration, government officials who work “colorblindly” are unable to measure or remediate racially detrimental situations.  

Recently, Professor Ian Haney López and others reverse the direction of inquiry. Instead of looking at race shaping law, they investigate how law has actively shaped U.S. society’s racial makeup. Influences and effects flow in both directions — from society to law, and from law back to society.

Haney López writes:

The law is one of the most powerful mechanisms by which any society creates, defines, and regulates itself. Its centrality in the constitution of society is especially pronounced in highly legalized and bureaucratized late-industrial democracies such as the United States. It follows, then, that to say race is socially constructed is to conclude that race is at least partially legally produced. Of course, it does so within the larger context of society, and so law is only one of many institutions and forces implicated in the formation of races . . . . [L]aw does more than simply codify race in the limited sense of merely giving legal definition to pre-existing social categories. Instead, legislatures and courts have served not only to fix the boundaries of race in forms we recognize today, but also to define the content of racial identities and to specify their relative privilege or disadvantage in U.S. society.  

Haney López argues that law constructs race primarily through three mechanisms. First, legal exclusion of people with certain features from a country constrains reproductive choices in a manner ultimately determining the range of variations of physical appearances within the society. Second, law gives racialized meanings to differences in physical features and ancestry by categorizing individuals in racial terms. And third, law “translates ideas about race into the material societal conditions that confirm and entrench those ideas.”

30  For example, I am told that there are no official statistics disaggregating tobacco use by minorities in Japan. But without such data, the government can not recognize or take action to address health disparities caused by tobacco use. As to the Ainu, this lack of data may also violate Japan’s international treaty obligations under Article 4 of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control.

31  See HANEY LÓPEZ supra note 6 at 9–10.

32  Id. at 14.
Applying Haney López’s methodology, law’s construction of race in Japan is evident through all three of the dynamics he describes.

In the first instance, the relationship between the Ainu people and “Wajin” (i.e., the dominant majority of Japanese persons) provides an outstanding example.33 For the Ainu, law has been the implementing mechanism of both assimilation and exclusion policies and law continues to work in the denial of the Ainu people in Japan today. At the outset, law contributed to the Wajin domination and Ainu subordination, affecting the material conditions of the “Dying Ainu.” When such notions turned into prevailing assumptions, they cycled back to further influence and determine policy decisions. Meiji period rules and regulations regarding Ainu custom, most notably the 1899 Hokkaidō Former Aboriginals Protection Act34, violently deprived the Ainu people of language, culture, and economic capability. In doing so, the law stealthily created and forcibly maintained the circumstances underlying prevailing racial notions of the Ainu as a “Dying Race.” Although perceived by Wajin and other outsider observers as the natural progression of Social Darwinism, the situation was anything but ordained by natural science. The impairment of Ainu lifestyles was “only natural,” of course, as the inevitable result of an intentionally created socio-legal system that forced the Ainu people into poverty and despair.

Forced assimilation of the Ainu, accomplished through law, also altered the physical appearances of the Ainu people and thus the Japanese nation as a whole. As race-based laws and derivative social practices worked to influence voluntary and involuntary reproductive activity, morphological aspects commonly associated with Ainu ethnic heritage lost a degree of distinctiveness in comparison, for example, to that which would have been observed even one hundred years before.

As with nationality laws in the United States, the Japanese Nationality Law35 was consciously designed and has been consistently applied to support and promote Wajin notions of mono-ethnicity. Besides blind indifference to the presence of Japanese national minorities, Prime Minister Nakasone’s inaccurate perception of a natural mono-ethnic order could only have come to pass because the Japanese Nationality Law de-nationalized Japanese citizenship and.


34 Hokkaidō Kyūdojin Hogo Hō [Hokkaidō Former Aboriginals Protection Act], Law No. 27 of 1899 (Japan), reprinted in Siddle, supra note 33, app. 1, at 194.

disfranchised hundreds of thousands of Koreans and Taiwanese persons resident in Japan who had been brought to imperial Japan as a colonial workforce.36 Japan also maintains a highly restrictive approach to dual nationality that Mie Murazumi has described as rooted in “notion[s] of loyalty in Japan’s culturally homogeneous society.”37 Although less directly implicating the Ainu, the Nationality Law, as written and as implemented, has physically created a Wajin-dominated nation with few apparent “others.”

Lastly, Professor Tamie Bryant’s groundbreaking study of Japan’s family registry laws offers yet another example of these hidden dynamics.38 Bryant’s writing shows how, for ethnic Koreans present in Japan and the historically discriminated Burakumin, the family registry laws offer a nearly perfect example of what Haney López describes when he argues that law gives racialized meanings to differences in ancestry by categorizing individuals in racial terms. Although not explicit in Bryant’s work, the same injurious state of affairs derive from the family registry laws to all minorities in Japan whose status is legally defined by citizenship.39

B. A New Paradigm for Race in Japan: The Wajin’s Whiteness

1. Whiteness

In Japan today, the Wajin majority is overwhelmingly dominant and privileged in comparison with Japan’s minority populations. In the U.S., we have a corresponding racial group who are overwhelmingly dominant and privileged: white people. To state the main point of this paper in six simple words: the Wajin are Japan’s white people.

Of course, the inquiry does not end there. If readers will accept the validity of my premise, what are the implications? The methodology of race studies that looks at white people in the U.S., i.e., Whiteness studies, provides a valuable set of analytical tools affording new understandings and insights when applied to Japan.

Looking carefully at the racial and social characteristics of white people is hardly a new thing. Professor David Roediger’s rich collection of writings,

36 See YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW 130-134, n. 16 (1998).
38 See Bryant supra note 28.
39 Professor Bryant’s work may be recognized as an early application of Critical Race Theory in comparative law study of Japan.
Black on White: Black Writers on What It Means to Be White, for example, carefully exhibits how examining and understanding white people has been a basic element of survival for people of color in the U.S. from the times of slavery forward. In his introduction, Roediger notes: “From folktales onward African Americans have been among the nation’s keenest students of white consciousness and white behavior.”40

While not a new phenomenon, Whiteness studies nevertheless only recently moved closer to the mainstream at U.S. universities and it has been brought forward by proponents of Critical Race Theory. Whiteness studies, or Critical White Studies, are not limited to Critical Race Theory writings, but Critical Race Theory writers in U.S. law schools have been actively involved in this work. Exposing hidden interrelations between Whiteness and American law has been among the most significant achievements of Critical Race Theory to date.41

“Whiteness” describes a set of distinct social circumstances enjoyed by whites in American society. (Once again, as with any racial identity, the boundaries are imprecise and amorphous. As Haney López notes, “it refers to an unstable category which gains its meaning only through social relations and that encompasses a profoundly diverse set of persons.”)42

Most notably however, Whiteness involves a vast range of social privileges and an intricately related but separate experience described as transparency. Privilege describes the other side of the “wages of whiteness”43—that is the benefits experienced by whites in America by virtue of their dominant status, and regardless of any intent or lack thereof to participate in racially oppressive structures imposed on people of color. Transparency means the ability of whites to live without recognizing race as a fundamental operating


41 Perhaps the most influential work on Whiteness in the Critical Race Theory repertoire is Professor Cheryl Harris’ 1993 Harvard Law Review article Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, identifying a legal property interest held by whites in the U.S. More recently, Professors Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic assembled a collection of excerpts from 114 writings (with brief synopses of numerous other works) into a single edited volume titled Critical White Studies, demonstrating the extraordinary range of writings in this area. CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1997).

42 HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 6, at xiv.

factor and without examining the impact of race (including race-based privilege) upon their life experiences.

Privilege may be especially difficult to recognize by one who is privileged. One of the most effective exercises in this task has been articulated by Professor Peggy McIntosh and is used often by teachers of race and ethnicity in the United States. McIntosh lists dozens of ordinary daily events that she, as a white person, can count on, but recognizes that her African American co-workers, friends, and acquaintances can not. For example, “I can go shopping alone most of the time, fairly well assured that I will not be followed or harassed by store detectives,” “I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people of my race widely and positively represented,” or “I did not have to educate our children to be aware of systemic racism for their own daily physical protection.”

Similarly, Professors Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis speak of “making systems of privilege visible” precisely because “examining privilege reveals that the characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are described as societal norms - as the way things are and as what is normal in society.”

Transparency may be best understood as one aspect of racial privilege and perhaps the most significant for the discussion that follows in this paper. Transparency in the present context means the lack of race consciousness among members of the privileged group as to their racial character. Professor Harlan Dalton calls this “race obliviousness.”

Dalton writes:

“Most White people, in my experience, tend not to think of themselves in racial terms. They know that they are White, of course, but mostly that translates into being not Black, not Asian-American, and not Native American. Whiteness, in and of itself, has little meaning. . . . [This] blinds Whites to the fact that their lives are shaped by race just as much as are the lives of people of color. . . . Far and away the most troublesome consequence of race

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44 Peggy McIntosh, *White Privilege and Male Privilege* (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988) in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW 22-23 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). McIntosh, a scholar in Women’s Studies, notes: “I think whites are carefully taught not to recognize white privilege as males are taught not to recognize male privilege.” Id. at 23.

obliviousness is the failure of many to recognize the privileges our society confers on them because they have white skin.46

Thus, racial transparency in this context is not Ralph Ellison’s “Invisible Man,”47 the Black man who is barely noticed in a White-dominant society. Rather, transparency in our discussion is first, a characteristic of Whites who are precisely and profoundly unaware of their Whiteness, and secondly, involves the ironic fact that White’s Whiteness is immediately and entirely obvious to non-Whites.48

2. Wajin-ness

Taking from American discourse the tenet that dominance and privilege are archetypically attributed to Whiteness, we may then recognize a corresponding social attribute for Japan that I label “Wajin-ness.”

Wajin-ness shares much with its U.S. counterpart. Racial subordination of minority populations is the most obvious commonality, well exemplified in Japan by the Wajin/Ainu history that I have written about previously and well documented in other works pertaining to Burakumin, ethnic Koreans in Japan, Ryukyu/Okinawan Islanders, Nikkei communities in Japan, other Asian communities in Japan, and smaller communities such as the multi-racial/ethnic people living in the Bonin/Ogasawara archipelago.49

Critical Race Theory helps us understand the implication of racial subordination and corresponding Wajin privilege. With both conscious and unconscious discrimination constantly burdening Japan’s minority populations, Wajin-ness, like Whiteness, includes countless elements of social privilege both cognitively recognized and unrecognized by its beneficiaries. Wajin experience privilege by living without the discrimination experienced by non-Wajin in Japan.50 Moreover, Wajin’s lives are further privileged (even apart from not

46 HARLAN L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES 105, 110 (1995). Dalton also excerpts McIntosh’s examples of white privilege. Id. at 111.
47 See generally, RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
48 Note that this is also different from the more common meaning of “transparency” in social processes, such as when we talk about transparency in politics, administrative affairs, or corporate governance. While that usage may be already familiar to Japanese readers, “transparency” in Critical Race Theory is something entirely different.
49 Levin, supra note 8. In writing that article, I learned much about these issues from TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI, RE-INVENTING JAPAN: TIME, SPACE, NATION (1998).
50 Though certainly many Wajin experience discrimination in other regards, such as owing to gender, sexual orientation, disability, socio-economic class, or the like. These dividing lines raise issues of
having to face discrimination). This is because, for example, they do not have to live through the (literal) alienation that Zainichi Koreans have in their lives. And they do not suffer the indigenous Ainu people’s relentless grief for loss of sovereignty over their homelands.

Critical Race Theory writings on Whiteness challenge us to turn our focus away from the minority victims of racism to the majority perpetrators. Thus, the discussion should not be only about the Ainu, Burakumin, or other minorities in Japan. We must also ask how Wajin privileges operate? To whose benefit? And with what costs?

Substituting “Wajin” for “white,” I quote from Delgado:

Why then do we draw the categories the way we do? Addressing this question includes examining what it means to be Wajin, how Wajinness became established legally, how certain groups moved in and out of the category of Wajinness, “passing”, the phenomenon of Wajin power and Wajin supremacy, and the automatic privileges that come with membership in the dominant race.

Of course, looking at Wajin-ness does not mean ignoring Japan’s minorities. In fact, the most insightful answers will likely be available from minority voices who can speak from the experience of enduring Wajin domination. Their unique perspective is based in what W.E.B. DuBois labeled “dual consciousness” and it forces them to constantly judge and interpret the Wajin world in a way that Wajin need not and can not.

Wajin transparency is also worthy of attention because it presents a different picture from what can be seen within U.S. racial dynamics. I contend that Japan’s potent discourse of racial homogeneity or mono-ethnicity and social attitudes and structures that tie in with that discourse represents the nearly perfect achievement of majority race transparency.

interconnectionality that are fully addressed in Critical Race Theory, but omitted intentionally in this paper. See e.g. DELGADO, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION at 51-56(2001).

This is also why the phrases “Ainu problem” or “Dowa problem” are inherently problematic and injurious. The phrases necessarily imply Wajin centrality and locate minority persons in Japan as an “other”. The phrases also ignore the fact that, for Ainu, Burakumin, and other minorities in Japan, the social circumstances are a “Wajin problem”.

DELGADO, supra note 50, at 75.

White transparency in the U.S. clearly exists. One malignant aspect of white transparency, for example, is that U.S. K-12 and university pedagogy commonly points to European (white) traditions and heritage as the society’s normative social core. There have been dramatic social contests over incorporating multi-culturalism into our educational systems. But aside from the furthest fringe among neo-Nazi groups and their associates, one no longer hears descriptions of the United States as a mono-racial, mono-ethnic nation as one might have years ago. From the time the U.S. moved past the infamous Dred Scott decision by enacting the Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, it seems hard to imagine any serious author or political leader denying the basic existence of minority populations in the United States.

In contrast, I believe Japan’s Wajin-dominant racial discourse represents the epitome of majority race transparency. Modern Japan’s mainstream racial discourse famously presents a false myth of homogeneity based upon a carefully constructed and maintained conception of a single Japanese race. This social system involves the denial (or virtual denial as de minimus) of the presence of ethnic and racial minorities in Japanese society. Thus denial, enabled by longstanding assimilation and exclusion policies, has been an essential means to subordinate minorities in Japan.

Although the conception of Japan as a homogeneous mono-ethnic society is not perfectly incorporated into the national consciousness, it is nearly so. This race project is evidenced repeatedly by public assertions from political leaders and it is also intricately wound through Japan’s nationalized educational pedagogy. Minority communities and their supporters routinely protest these circumstances and they have achieved small steps such as through the 1997 Ainu Culture Law. But the overall picture remains relatively stable. Thus, in obscuring the existence of minorities in Japan, transparency is almost perfectly achieved.

54 One does hear claims of the U.S. as a Christian nation in mainstream discourse, but that is a different issue.


56 For some Wajins, the extraordinary degree of racial transparency beyond that of Whites in the U.S. may leave them unaware even that race-based social boundaries and minority subordination exist in Japan, or at least profoundly unaware of many painful realities.

So why is this extreme degree of transparency such a significant problem for race relations in Japan? Professor Taunya Lovell Banks’ apt prescription for racial reconciliation in the U.S. reminds us that “[t]here can be no establishment of trust between blacks and whites, however, without public dialogues, and these dialogs must include an accounting of America’s unpleasant racial past.” 58 Wildman and Davis present a similar argument: “What we do not say, what we do not talk about, maintains the status quo.” 59 Yet even to begin a dialog concerning race in Japan, Wajins must first tear down the dominating framework of insidious minority transparency.

Thus, the notion of racial transparency in Japan points towards three necessary steps for racial reconciliation and justice in Japan. First, Wajin must become cognizant of minority experiences in Japan – including both histories and present realities. Second, Wajin must come to understand their own Wajinness – how their lives are privileged by historical and ongoing racial inequalities. And only then, with transparency overcome, Wajin can listen to Professors Banks, Wildman, and Davis’ advice to engage in a meaningful dialog towards racial reconciliation.

4. Using Critical Race Theory to Advance Race Justice in Japan

Race praxis is a critical pragmatic process of race theory generation and translation, practical engagement, material change, and reflection. It grounds justice at the juncture of progressive race theory and antisubordination practice. 60

Medical doctors ordinarily strive to identify the situs of an illness in the body in order to prescribe a course of treatment. In the same manner, recognizing law’s role in the construction of race strengthens anti-racist efforts by revealing crucial targets for justice-based legal reform. Using Critical Race


59 Wildman and Davis, supra note 45 at 885. Wildman and Davis continue: “But to describe or to talk about these unspoken systems means we need to use language. But even when we try to talk about privilege, the language that we use inhibits our ability to perceive the systems of privilege that comprise the status quo.” Id. This overlaps with my argument for putting the words “Wajin” and “Wajinness” into common Japanese usage.

To be sure, law’s construction of race need not be harmful. Thus, for example, despite the plaintiffs’ technical loss, the Nibutani Dam court’s extensive decision documented and acknowledged centuries of the Wajin misdeeds against the Ainu people. The court brought forward to the Japanese public and its government leaders present day recognition of Wajin culpability and declared the Ainu people to be a distinct indigenous minority in Japan whose members are entitled to constitutional and international human rights with regard to their Ainu identity. This holding broke new ground by penetrating the outer boundaries defining Japanese nationhood and the inner boundaries pertaining to racial justice within the nation. The decision, carried by the media beyond the pages of law books to the broader society, reconstructed Japanese notions of race. This may prove to be the most lasting achievement of the Nibutani Dam decision.

In thinking about law reform in Japan, Critical Race Theory authors who consider the genesis and impact of the famous Civil Rights achievements of the 1950s and 1960s provide useful analytical tools. The interest convergence principle, for example, illustrates that beneficial change for racial minorities only arises when the majority’s interests will also be advanced. This derives from Professor Derrick Bell’s hypothesis (later confirmed by legal historian Professor Mary Dudziak) that the results in Brown vs. Board of Education reflected Cold War imperatives for white elites in the U.S. The late Professor Alan Freeman’s racial homeostasis principle postulates that dominant majorities only advance the requisite amounts of racial change necessary to neutralize political pressure from racial minorities, while leaving fundamental

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61 Critical Race Theory is not without critics. For example, Professors Suzanna Sherry and Daniel Farber’s 1997 book, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law, attacks many premises of Critical Race Theory as overly subjective and intellectually dishonest, by holding on to more traditional understandings pertaining to race, merit, and the appropriate boundaries of legal scholarship.


63 These issues are explored in Levin, supra note 8.

racial hierarchies intact. Accordingly, apparently beneficial changes in fact may represent backward steps if the potential for even greater change is thereby undone.

Both of these schemes inform us about Japan now and in the future. To the extent that minorities in Japan have made apparently positive gains in recent years (and this may be true with regards to issues such as voting rights and employment rights for foreigners), interest convergence trains us to ask what Wajin interests actually were advanced by such changes. At a minimum, interest convergence fits with the Japan’s often-seen change mechanisms of recourse to international law and so-called “gaiatsu.” These pressure strategies build up reasons why the Wajin majority may find it in its interest to change. The interest convergence principle also offers a strategic methodology for groups presently advocating for change. They may frame their proposals in terms that explicitly highlight Wajin benefits (for example, pointing to the benefits that majority students gain from multi-culturalism or diversity in educational settings).

Racial homeostasis principles also caution advocates for change. Professor Richard Siddle essentially incorporates this scheme of analysis in his study of the 1997 Ainu Culture Law. In a recent article, Siddle argues that the much-acclaimed progress for Ainu people achieved by the 1997 law falls short of the corresponding losses the law represents, in consideration of the significant weakening of the Ainu people’s political movement that followed the law’s enactment and implementation. Thus, the Ainu Culture Law was one step forward, two steps back, while Wajin elites who participated in or supported the reform could consider themselves progressive racial reformers.

With regards to Wajin-ness, Japan’s resemblance to U.S. racial elements in terms of domination, privilege, and transparency suggests that Japanese Wajin-ness and U.S. Whiteness are quite similar. The ideology of Wajin supremacy inside Japan, particularly in light of the extraordinary degree of observed transparency, most likely underlies a substantial portion of what needs to be addressed in working towards a racially just society there. Moreover, as Critical White Studies have helped advance racial justice efforts in the U.S., it is time to set a corresponding agenda for Critical Wajin Studies.

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Critical Wajin Studies will not be the same as Japan’s famous *Nihonjinron*, which looks at how the mythical “Japanese” fit in to an ethno-racial global framework. Japan’s crucial race questions are domestic, including (but not limited to) the questions raised in this paper. Moreover, Wajin studies should be informed by and should include (but not be limited to) non-Wajin voices, hopefully leading the way to better understandings and meaningful social change.

Professor Charles Lawrence articulates a model of anti-racism praxis based in “transformative politics.” Lawrence’s transformative politics . . . seeks to change the political consciousness of those privileged by systems of subordination. The task is to help the privileged comprehend the profound costs associated with inequality - the public costs of prisons, crime, illiteracy, disease, and the violence of an alienated underclass - as well as the personal costs of loneliness and anomie in a world where no one is responsible for the pain of any other person.67

This paper does not aim to answer all of the questions on race and race privilege in Japan. But I hope this will be a starting point – to launch a new field of Critical Wajin Studies in Japan for Japanese insiders (Wajin and non-Wajin) to explore and develop. This is because efforts for transformative politics are overdue in both the U.S. and Japan, two multi-racial, multi-ethnic nations. Each nation’s successes and failures can teach the other. There is certainly a great deal that still needs to be learned.

批判的人種理論と日本法

和拡の人種的特権について

見失われるという危機である。

一、はじめに

リーガル・リレシズムは、法と経済学を結びつける、法と社会（運動）と法と経済学を締じたものである。本国の法と社会、運動と国の法を結びつけるものである。リーガル・リレシズムは、法と社会、運動と国の法を結びつけるものである。リーガル・リレシズムは、法と社会、運動と国の法を結びつけるものである。

二、用語と諸条例（その定義）
親戚に現象が起こる。

表2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>立場</th>
<th>例</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>自己</td>
<td>自己の意見を信じる</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>他人</td>
<td>他者の意見を尊重する</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

さらに、親戚に現象は、社会的・経済的背景を表す。

親戚に現象が関係する場合、特定の文化や価値観に基づいて現れる。このような現象を理解するためには、その背景を理解することが重要である。親戚に現象は、特定の社会的・経済的背景を反映し、社会的・経済的背景が変化すると、親戚に現象も変化する傾向がある。
ここで言うフィリスクティックな人種の差別は、まず差別の概念を明確にする必要がある。差別という言葉は、本来、人種や民族、宗教、性別などの違いを基にした極端な偏見や評価を指すものである。しかし、実際の社会では、これらを基にした偏見や差別が存在するため、差別の概念を明確にする必要がある。

日本においては、ジェンダー差別や性差別は法律で禁止されているが、実際の社会では依然として問題が多い。また、人種差別や民族差別も法制化されているが、実態は依然として深刻である。

差別を防止するためには、まず差別を理解することが必要である。差別を理解することで、差別に対する反発が生じるようになり、差別防止のための対策が考えられる。

したがって、差別の概念を理解することで、差別の防止に向けた対策が考えられる。
最近は、イアン・ヘイニー・ローパス教授の著書『理解のための言語』に始まる研究は、言語の分野において大きな影響を与えている。その研究は、言語の構造と機能の理解を深めるために、言語の形成、変化、及びその演化的プロセスを明らかにすることを目指している。

ローパス教授の研究は、特に言語の形態と機能、及び言語の変化を分析するために、多様な言語学的概念を用いる。彼の研究は、言語の構造と機能の理解を深め、言語の変化及びその演化的プロセスを明らかにすることを目指している。

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B 日本における人種を論じる新形

1 ノーワイトネス

「ノーワイトネス」は、人種という概念を否定し、人種を「差別」や「偏見」の枠組みから外してしまうことを指す言葉です。この概念は、人種という概念そのものに対する批判的な視点を示しています。日本においても、人種という概念は、種族や文化、経済等の様々な要素を組み合わせて作られ、その多様性が遺る社会構造を反映しています。

2 ホワイトイン（白人性）

今日の日本においては、ホワイトイン（白人性）が強調され、人種という概念自体が否定される傾向があります。しかし、この傾向は、人種という概念が日本社会においても深く根ざしていることを示しています。ホワイトインの視点から、人種という概念を否定することは、人種差別や偏見を根絶するための第一歩といえるでしょう。
私たちは、多様なホワイトハウスを支えているのです。そして、自分たち自身が、白い人であることを理解しているのです。これが、ホワイトハウスの精神です。よって、ホワイトハウスは、私たちの生活を支えているのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防いでいるのです。そして、ホワイトハウスの精神は、私たちは、自分たちの土地に対する権利を失うのを防い
批判的人種理論を用いて日本の歴史と人種関係

この批判的人種理論は、人種理論を生成し、訳し、実践活動に携わり、物質的条件を変える、反逆する、批判的に、プラグマティックな過程である。それらは革新の人種理論と従来に抵抗する人種実践と接合を正しく配置するものである。

病果を特定することが処方箋を書くのに必要であることを著者が知っている。同様に、人種の構築に関する法が果たしている役割を知ることが必要である。正義の人種実践の必要性を強調する、裁判所の裁判の必要性を強調する。

もう一つ、法による人種の構築が常に危険をもたらすことは明らかである。たとえば、二法谷事件の裁判が示すように、裁判所の裁判が正義の必要性を強調することが不可能である。裁判所は今日の日本の公衆と政府の敵対連合であり、人間の非難可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスクの人々はその可能性を知らしめ、アイスク的人
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VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE CONTRIBUTORS

B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE REVIEWERS

C. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE EDITORS