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Hi Blog. HNY and AkeOme. Last month was a year-end break for the Shingetsu News Agency and my Visible Minorities column, so let me open 2024 with yesterday’s JT article showing just how much things have not changed for the past quarter century. Article first, then my comment:<\/p>\n
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Japan should aim to maintain population of 80 million by 2100: panel<\/strong> PHOTO CAPTION: Akio Mimura, honorary chairman of Nippon Steel and head of a private panel focused on depopulation, submits the group’s proposal to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo on Tuesday. | KYODO<\/strong><\/p>\n (Ed: This actually made a pretty big domestic news splash. \u00a0See all the headlines via Google here: \u4eba\u53e3\u6226\u7565\u4f1a\u8b70<\/a>. You can also see word about this even on the PM’s official website<\/a>, but in the true spirit of government openness it only offers photo-ops with no way to actually read the proposal or see who’s on the panel.)<\/em><\/p>\n Amid concerns over rapid depopulation, a private panel has proposed that Japan should aim to have a stable population of 80 million by 2100 in order to maintain economic growth.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Last April, the government released an estimate that the population would be reduced by half to about 63 million in 2100, with 40% of people expected to be 65 or older.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Japan has wrestled with the issue of a declining birthrate for decades, but the situation is about to \u201cchange drastically,\u201d with the country now entering a serious phase of population decline, the panel, headed by Nippon Steel honorary chairman Akio Mimura and consisting of 28 members including prominent academics and business leaders, said Tuesday.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The country’s population in 1930 was about 63 million, but the proportion of those 65 years or older was just 4.8% then, according to the panel, which submitted its proposal to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida the same day.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n To avoid such a future, Japan needs to slow down the pace of the decline and eventually stop it, the panel said, adding that government strategy should focus on stabilizing the population at around 80 million by 2100. As of last month, Japan’s population was estimated to be 124 million.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The panel carried out several simulations and argued that if the country raised the total fertility rate \u2014 the average number of children a woman gives birth to in her lifetime \u2014 to 1.6 by around 2040, 1.8 by around 2050 and eventually 2.07 by 2060, it could maintain a population of around 80 million by 2100.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n In 2022, Japan\u2019s fertility rate fell for the seventh straight year to a record-tying low of 1.26. A rate of 2.07 is considered to be necessary to keep the population stable.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cThis is not an easy task, but it is by no means impossible if full-scale efforts are launched to fight the declining birthrate,\u201d the panel said, highlighting that it would take decades for such a strategy to start to bear fruit and that it was inevitable for the population to be smaller than it is today.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Still, if Japan can maintain a population of 80 million and also boost productivity, then the country would be able to see annual economic growth of about 0.9% from 2050 to 2100, according to the panel.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n In tackling the issue, the government should establish a new committee of experts directly under the prime minister that would oversee the planning and implementation of the population strategy, the panel suggested.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The panel said one major problem was that the government and the private sector had failed to share sufficient information with the public about the gravity of rapid depopulation and the importance of preventing it.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cIt is unfoundedly optimistic to say that \u2018The population may be dwindling, but Japanese society will continue as before,\u2019\u201d the panel said.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Measures implemented by the government up until now to combat the declining birthrate may have produced some results, but they have been mostly \u201cone-off and stopgap,\u201d so they have not been enough to turn around the trend, the panel added.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Kishida has made tackling the country’s plummeting birthrate a top policy item and pledged to introduce \u201cunprecedented steps\u201d to head off the severe long-term economic impact. He has said that the government will raise the budget for child care-related policies over the next three years, with an extra \u00a53.6 trillion ($24.8 billion) to be spent each year.<\/em> <\/strong>ENDS<\/p>\n \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/<\/p>\n COMMENT FROM DEBITO<\/strong>: There is nothing new under the sun when you have the same old people retreading the same old shinola to the same perpetually-elected party in power. \u00a0Getting all these people together to wish for a skypie solution of increasing birthrates (while somehow also boosting productivity) is silly, as it has already been proposed multiple times over the decades without success. \u00a0This is no way to craft public policy that actually solves a problem.<\/p>\n Indicatively, *once again* this report makes no mention of immigration, despite both the UN and then-PM Obuchi agreeing as far back as the *YEAR 2000* (see below) that immigration is inevitable to keep the economy going. \u00a0But as we saw afterwards in 2009, xenophobic politics intervened, and even Japan’s demographers are forbidden to mention foreign inflows as part of Japan’s domestic demographic science<\/a>. (See My JT column on that here<\/a>.)<\/p>\n A further note: \u00a0Whenever you have business interests involved (as if they’re any experts on demographic engineering), the primary concern will be about business interests, i.e., profits and cheap labor. \u00a0Now remember what the likes of elite business lobby Keidanren<\/a> wrought by bringing in foreign labor on exploitative revolving-door visa regimes since 1991 (the “Trainee” slave-labor program,<\/a> for example). \u00a0Allowing the grubby little hands of Japan’s business lobbies any more input into future policy drives only guarantees more inhumanity, because with population drops and an elderly society come labor shortages. \u00a0Who will fill them? \u00a0Robots; but robots don’t pay taxes into the rickety national pension system. \u00a0So foreigners. \u00a0Hence business interests will only continue to advocate importing labor without ever letting foreign workers become permanent Japanese residents.<\/p>\n In conclusion, a quarter-century later nothing has been learned. \u00a0Just keep on saying the same old shinola and watch as Japan’s demographic juggernaut bankrupts the country. \u00a0As long foreseen. \u00a0Debito Arudou, Ph.D.<\/p>\n UPDATE: \u00a0Members of the <\/em>Jinkou Senryaku Kaigi, courtesy of JK. \u00a0(Source is here, pg. 14<\/a>)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/<\/p>\n Excerpt from my book “Embedded Racism<\/a>” (Second Edition 2022) on this subject, Chapter 10, including footnotes:<\/p>\n Figure 10.1 was data from the First Edition, which indicated Japan\u2019s economy had, from the bursting of its economic \u201cbubble\u201d in 1993 through the year 2011, shrunk<\/em> by nearly half a percent every year on average<\/em> compared to its developed-country or regional brethren. As of this Second Edition, now incorporating 26 years of data from 1993 to 2019 (before the Covid Pandemic hit), Figure 10.2 shows that Japan is no longer in an average economic contraction, but its GDP per capita has grown on average by less than a percent per year, still easily underperforming most of the same select countries. (I surmise that Japan\u2019s major growth industry, tourism to Japan, has significantly affected these numbers; as noted in Chapter Eight, tourism\u2019s contribution to Japan\u2019s total GDP has expanded from 1.7 to 2 percent since 2010. This underscores Japan\u2019s need to avoid \u201cJapanese Only\u201d signs and rules.)<\/strong><\/p>\n It is not clear that even these low growth rates are sustainable, given Japan\u2019s perpetual demographic crisis. According to the most recent GOJ figures as this book went to press (June 30, 2021), Japan\u2019s population continues to decrease, as its birthrate has long been below replacement levels, reaching the lowest on record in 2019 before being further worsened by the 2020 Covid Pandemic.[i]<\/a> The number of (Japanese citizen\u2014sic<\/em>) children under age fifteen has dropped to record lows for 40 consecutive years, representing the lowest population percentage amongst major countries with populations of at least 40 million.[ii]<\/a> Japan\u2019s population has also been shrinking since 2011, and from the current level of 125.3 million (including the rising number of foreign residents), [iii]<\/a> dropping by close to one million per year; at this rate it is projected to drop below 100 million by 2049.[iv]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, Japan\u2019s working-age population is forecast to fall by nearly half from 81.7 million in 2010 to 44.2 million by 2060.[v]<\/a> In terms of people above a \u201creasonable working age\u201d of 65, the projected elderly but not yet infirm (ages 65-74) are projected to be at around 22% of Japan\u2019s population; if you include all elderly and infirm (65 and up), this will comprise nearly 36% of Japan\u2019s total population by 2050.[vi]<\/a> Thus, with Japan\u2019s demographic pyramid being top-heavy and projected to have one of the world\u2019s highest median ages,[vii]<\/a> the elderly and pensioners will soon outnumber young pension contributors, putting the solvency of Japan\u2019s social security pension plans into jeopardy.[viii]<\/a>(Note that this is not unexpected: the GOJ and the UN both forecast this happening as early as the year 2000, when the UN advised Japan to immediately start bringing in more than a half million foreign residents per year<\/em>.)[ix]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n [i]<\/a> \u201cAn uphill battle to reverse the falling birthrate.\u201d Japan Times<\/em>, June 4, 2020; \u201cThe COVID-19 Pandemic is Accelerating Japan\u2019s Population Decline: A Statistical Analysis.\u201d Nippon.com<\/em>, May 25, 2021.<\/p>\n [ii]<\/a> \u201cJapan\u2019s child population falls to record low 16.17 million.\u201d Japan Times\/Jiji Press<\/em>, May 4, 2015; \u201cJapan’s child population hits record low after 40 years of decline.\u201d Kyodo News<\/em>, May 4, 2021.<\/p>\n [iii]<\/a> www.stat.go.jp\/english\/data\/jinsui\/tsuki\/index.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n [iv]<\/a> \u201cThe COVID-19 Pandemic is Accelerating Japan\u2019s Population Decline: A Statistical Analysis.\u201d Nippon.com<\/em>, May 25, 2021.<\/p>\n [v]<\/a> \u201cJapan Cabinet minister wary of opening \u2018Pandora\u2019s Box\u2019 of immigration.\u201d Japan Times<\/em>, May 13, 2015; \u201cJapan\u2019s Population Falls for Ninth Straight Year.\u201d Nippon.com<\/em>, April 30, 2020.<\/p>\n [vi]<\/a> \u201cK\u014dreisha jink\u014d (65-74, 75 ij\u014d) to sono wariai<\/em>\u201d [Population and proportion of elderly (65-74, 75+)]. Sh\u016bkan Ekonomisuto<\/em>, January 15, 2008: 16.<\/p>\n [vii]<\/a> \u201cA declining Japan loses its once-hopeful champions.\u201d Washington Post<\/em>, October 27, 2012, particularly the graphic \u201cAs Japan\u2019s population ages, optimism wanes.\u201d More current statistics show that South Korea may overtake Japan in terms of highest median age by 2050, but Japan will still remain in second place. See<\/em>www.statista.com\/statistics\/673014\/top-ten-countries-with-highest-projected-median-age\/<\/a> (accessed June 2, 2021).<\/p>\n [viii]<\/a> One often-touted solution to the demographic crisis is automation, i.e., getting robots into fields that require elderly care, such as hospitals and care centers. See for example<\/em> GOJ policy trial balloons floated at \u201cBetter than people: Why the Japanese want their robots to act more like humans.\u201d Economist<\/em> (London), December 20, 2005; \u201cGovernment tackles population decline.\u201d Yomiuri Shinbun<\/em>, August 26, 2014, archived at www.debito.org\/?p=12609<\/a>; \u201cAging Japan: Robots may have role in future of elder care.\u201d Reuters<\/em>, March 27, 2018; et al. However, robots do not pay taxes, so without young people paying into pension plans for the current elderly, I do not see how automation will make up the financial shortfall when the young taxpayers reach retirement.<\/p>\n
\nThe Japan Times. BY KAZUAKI NAGATA, STAFF WRITER, Jan 10, 2024<\/strong>
\nhttps:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/news\/2024\/01\/10\/japan\/society\/population-proposal\/<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/01\/Jinkou-Senryaku-Kaigi-Members-2024-1024x669.png\")
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