{"id":6000,"date":"2010-02-22T01:53:28","date_gmt":"2010-02-21T16:53:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.debito.org\/?p=6000"},"modified":"2010-02-22T01:53:28","modified_gmt":"2010-02-21T16:53:28","slug":"smjngo-combined-report-for-un-cerd-committee-regarding-japans-human-rights-record","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/?p=6000","title":{"rendered":"SMJ\/NGO combined report for UN CERD Committee regarding Japan’s human rights record"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Hi Blog. \u00a0Double feature for today: \u00a0The Government of Japan comes under review this month in Geneva by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. I was invited to submit a chapter for a report to the UN by the NGO Solidarity with Migrants Japan (SMJ) on how Japan is doing with enforcing it. \u00a0As I conclude:<\/p>\n

“In conclusion, the situation is that in Japan, racial discrimination remains unconstitutional and unlawful under the ICERD, yet not illegal. Japan has had more than a decade since 1996 to pass a criminal law against RD. Its failure to do so can only be interpreted as a clear violation of ICERD Article 2(1): \u201cStates Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay [emphasis added] a policy of eliminating racial discrimination.\u201d We urge the Committee to make the appropriate advisements to the Japanese government to pass a law against racial discrimination without any further delay.”<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Full text below (mine is chapter two), sans photos of “Japanese Only” signs. \u00a0You can download the report in its entirety (including signs) as a Word file from:<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.debito.org\/SMJCERDreport2010.doc<\/a><\/p>\n

Enjoy. \u00a0Let’s see how the UN and GOJ respond. \u00a0Here’s how the GOJ responded in 2008 — read and guffaw at their claim that they have taken “every conceivable measure to fight against \u00a0racial discrimination”<\/a>. \u00a0Arudou Debito in Calgary<\/p>\n

\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NGO Report Regarding the Rights of Non-Japanese Nationals, Minorities of Foreign Origins, and Refugees in Japan<\/strong> <\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Prepared for the<\/p>\n

76th<\/sup> United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Session<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
February 2010 <\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n\n\n\n
Compiled and published by: Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ)<\/p>\n

Edited by: Ralph Hosoki (assisted by Nobuyuki Sato and Masataka Okamoto)<\/p>\n

Address: Tomisaka Christian Center 2-203, 2-17-41 Koishikawa, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN 112-0002\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Phone: (+81)(0)3-5802-6033; Fax: (+81)(0)3-5802-6034; E-mail: fmwj@jca.apc.org<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

TABLE OF CONTENTS<\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

FOREWORD<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Ralph Hosoki 1<\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY<\/strong>.. 2<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 1<\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction: Migrants, Migrant Workers, Refugees and Japan\u2019s Immigration Policy<\/em><\/p>\n

Kaoru Koyama and Masataka Okamoto. 3<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 2<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Race and Nationality-based Entrance Refusals at Private and Quasi-Public Establishments<\/em><\/p>\n

Debito Arudou. 7<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 3<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Anti-Korean and Chinese Remarks Made by Public Officials<\/em><\/p>\n

Nobuyuki Sato. 10<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 4<\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Nationality Acquisition and Name Changes: The Denial of Han and Korean Ethnic Surnames through Limitations in Kanji Characters Designated for Personal Names<\/em><\/p>\n

Masataka Okamoto. 12<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 5<\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

The Education of the Children of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities<\/em><\/p>\n

Yasuko Morooka. 15<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 6<\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Discriminatory Administrative Government Procedures in Residence Status Application Approval Procedures and Employment<\/em><\/p>\n

Satoru Furuya and Kaoru Koyama. 20<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 7<\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Migrant Women in Japan: Victims of Multiple Forms of Discrimination and Violence and the Government\u2019s Lack of Concern<\/em><\/p>\n

Leny Tolentino. 25<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

CHAPTER 8<\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Racial Discrimination within the Refugee Recognition System<\/em><\/p>\n

Kenji Iwata. 30<\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

CREDITS<\/strong>.. 34<\/p>\n

FOREWORD <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ralph HOSOKI<\/p>\n

(Division of International Human Rights, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

This NGO report has been compiled by the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ), and contains chapters prepared by various SMJ member organizations for the reference of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its consideration of the third to sixth periodic reports submitted by the Japanese government in accordance with Article 9 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD\/C\/JPN\/3-6).<\/p>\n

Evolving from the Forum on Asian Immigrant Workers established in 1987, SMJ was established in April 1997 with the aim to promote communication and common action among organizations throughout Japan working to provide assistance and relief and striving to protect, promote, and realize the human rights of migrants, migrant workers, refugees, and their families in Japan.\u00a0 Since then, SMJ has grown into a nationwide network of 87 NGOs, civil society organizations, labor unions, religious organizations, professional associations, and women\u2019s rights organizations, with an individual member base of 337 (2008 figures).<\/p>\n

Domestically, SMJ has organized annual conferences and symposia on migrant and migrant worker rights, published books and monthly newsletters that have been widely used and consulted throughout domestic civil society circles, organized empowerment events and activities for migrants and non-Japanese national residents, engaged in annual negotiations with government ministries involved in drafting policies that affect migrants and their families, and networked with politicians and bureaucrats from various political parties and ministries.\u00a0 SMJ also recognizes that concerns surrounding migrant rights are also rooted within a broader international context, and has collaborated with regional and international migrant rights organizations and networks to bring awareness of migrant rights issues in Japan to the fore.<\/p>\n

The report\u2019s contributors, while being active members of the migrant rights advocacy community in Japan, are also migrants, academics, researchers, lawyers, civil servants, and lobbyists who are authoritative experts in not only the various social, economic, political, cultural, and legal challenges that ethnic minorities and non-Japanese nationals, residents, and workers face in Japan, but also on the intersections<\/em> of these complex issues and the interactions<\/em> between the government, Japanese civil society, and migrants\/ethnic minorities themselves.\u00a0 Each chapter addresses specific issues that non-Japanese nationals, ethnic minorities of foreign origins, migrants, and refugees face in Japan, and highlights the current state of affairs, the main challenges and problems, and various NGO policy recommendations.<\/p>\n

Please direct any inquiries or requests for additional information to the following contacts.<\/p>\n

1)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan Secretariat (office):<\/p>\n

Address: Tomisaka Christian Center 2-203, 2-17-41 Koishikawa, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN 112-0002; Phone: (+81)(0)3-5802-6033; Fax: (+81)(0)3-5802-6034; E-mail: fmwj@jca.apc.org<\/a><\/p>\n

2)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Report editors:<\/p>\n

Ralph Hosoki: ittonen@hotmail.com<\/a><\/p>\n

Nobuyuki Sato: raik@abox5.so-net.ne.jp<\/a><\/p>\n

Masataka Okamoto: okamoto@fukuoka-pu.ac.jp<\/a><\/p>\n

NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY<\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

To provide nuanced disambiguation and to avoid the exclusionary overtones of the terms \u201cforeign\u201d and \u201cforeigner,\u201d various (and sometimes overlapping) terms have been used throughout this report.<\/p>\n

When referring to government documents or statistics, policy-related pronouns, and direct quotes, terms such as \u201cforeigner<\/span>\u201d or \u201cforeign resident<\/span>\u201d are used because they reflect the terminology used in official translations.<\/p>\n

However, unless otherwise stated:<\/p>\n

\u201cMigrants<\/span>\u201d and \u201cmigrant workers<\/span>\u201d are used to refer to old and newcomer[1]<\/a> residents of non-Japanese nationalities and\/or minority ethnic backgrounds, with the latter emphasizing the engagement in remunerative activities \u2013 both de facto and de jure \u2013 and including short-term or temporary workers of non-Japanese nationalities who are commonly referred to in government documents as \u201cforeign workers.\u201d<\/p>\n

The following two terms are used in contexts where one\u2019s nationality is emphasized.\u00a0 \u201cNon-Japanese national<\/span>\u201d refers to anyone who does not possess Japanese nationality, regardless of the individual\u2019s length of stay in Japan.\u00a0 In contrast, the term \u201cnon-Japanese national residents<\/span>\u201d refers to non-Japanese nationals who have set roots or grounds for basic livelihood in Japan.<\/p>\n

Additionally, with regard to non-Japanese national ethnic Koreans in Japan, \u201cKorean residents<\/span>\u201d refers to both old and newcomer individuals of Korean ethnic background.\u00a0 However, \u201cResident Koreans<\/span>\u201d refers specifically to oldcomers and their descendants.\u00a0 Ethnic Koreans with Japanese nationality residing in Japan are referred to as \u201cKorean Japanese<\/span>.\u201d<\/p>\n

CHAPTER 1<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction:<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Migrants, Migrant Workers, Refugees and Japan\u2019s Immigration Policy<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

Kaoru KOYAMA<\/p>\n

(Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

Masataka OKAMOTO<\/p>\n

(Vice Secretary-General, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010<\/strong>Introduction<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong><\/p>\n

As of the end of 2008, the number of registered non-Japanese national residents in Japan totaled 2,217,000 (1.7% of Japan\u2019s total population) \u2013 a 30% (531,000) increase from 1,686,444 in 2000, right before the Japanese government\u2019s previous CERD review in March 2001 (see table below).\u00a0 There are also an additional 110,000 \u201coverstayers\u201d and other undocumented residents.<\/p>\n

In tandem with this trend, 121,000 non-Japanese national residents acquired Japanese nationality between 2001 and 2008 (76,500 Korean residents and 35,500 Chinese residents; the total number of Korean and Chinese resident naturalizations between 1952 and 2008 were 320,000 and 88,000, respectively).\u00a0 Additionally, between 1985 and 2006, the percentage of marriages between Japanese and non-Japanese nationals increased from 0.93% to 6.1%, and with the birth of 225,000 children born between parents through international marriages in the 10 years between 1999 and 2008, there has been a rapid increase in ethnic minorities with Japanese nationality.<\/p>\n

According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare\u2019s May 2008 estimates, there were 925,000 (2006 figure) migrant workers working in Japan.\u00a0 Since the 1980s, the number of migrant workers has increased, and with the 1990 revision to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, it became possible for non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent from South America and the families of returnees from China[2]<\/a> to migrate to Japan.\u00a0 However, despite these realities, the government has pushed through with its stance of not recruiting \u201clow-skilled\u201d migrant workers, and has not attempted to implement policies to protect the rights of migrants and migrant workers.<\/p>\n

Registered Non-Japanese National Residents in Japan \uff08end of 2008 figures\uff09<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Total<\/td>\nChina<\/td>\nKorea<\/td>\nBrazil<\/td>\nPhilippines<\/td>\nPeru<\/td>\nU.S.A.<\/td>\nThailand<\/td>\nVietnam<\/td>\nIndonesia<\/td>\nOthers<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2,217,426<\/p>\n

100\uff05<\/td>\n

655,377<\/p>\n

29.6%<\/td>\n

589,239<\/p>\n

26.6%<\/td>\n

312,582<\/p>\n

14.1%<\/td>\n

210,617<\/p>\n

9.5%<\/td>\n

59,723<\/p>\n

2.7%<\/td>\n

52,683<\/p>\n

2.4%<\/td>\n

42,609<\/p>\n

1.9%<\/td>\n

41,136<\/p>\n

1.9%<\/td>\n

27,250<\/p>\n

1.2%<\/td>\n

226,210<\/p>\n

10.2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

\u3010<\/strong>Increase in the Number of Refugees, Migrant Workers, and Their Families<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. 1. <\/strong>Indochinese Refugees and Convention Refugees<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Due to shifts in political regimes and civil war within Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, an exodus of two million Indochinese refugees flowed into the neighboring countries.\u00a0 Initially, the Japanese government took a stance of only allowing the temporary entry of refugees and not settlement.\u00a0 However, this was criticized by the G7 countries among others, so in 1978, the government announced that it would allow the settlement of Indochinese refugees.\u00a0 Despite this concession, the designated number of refugees allowed to settle was small (the designated number was 500 refugees in 1979, and this was subsequently expanded to 10,000) while refugee recognition was strict, and many refugees eventually moved on to the U.S. and Canada, thinking that no matter how hard they tried, ethnic and racial discrimination would foreclose their success in Japan.\u00a0 Due to such reasons, as of the end of 2005, Japan had only accepted 11,319 Indochinese refugees for settlement (of which 76% were Vietnamese).<\/p>\n

    Additionally, in adherence to its obligations stemming from the ratification of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Japanese government implemented the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1982.\u00a0 However, the government has been passive in its recognition of Convention refugees, and between 1982 and the end of 2008, only 508 of the 7,297 individuals who applied for refugee status have been recognized as refugees (see table below).<\/p>\n

    Numbers of Refugee Status Recognition Applicants and Recognized Persons in Japan (2001\u20132008)<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Year<\/td>\n2001<\/td>\n2002<\/td>\n2003<\/td>\n2004<\/td>\n2005<\/td>\n2006<\/td>\n2007<\/td>\n2008<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Applicants<\/td>\n353<\/td>\n250<\/td>\n336<\/td>\n426<\/td>\n384<\/td>\n954<\/td>\n816<\/td>\n1,599<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Recognized Persons<\/td>\n26<\/td>\n14<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n46<\/td>\n34<\/td>\n41<\/td>\n57<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

    These Indochinese refugees and Convention refugees have encountered various forms of ethnic and racial discrimination within Japanese society, and their children have had to cope with identity conflicts and crises (i.e. cultural and linguistic gaps between parents who can only speak their native tongues and children who can only speak Japanese).\u00a0 However, ethnic and racial discrimination against refugees rarely surface because given their status as refugees, it is difficult for them to raise a unified critical voice against Japanese society.<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. 2. <\/strong>Migrant Workers and Their Families<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      As stated in paragraph 17 of its report[3]<\/a> to the Committee, the Japanese government maintains its stance that \u201cthe acceptance of foreign workers in professional and technical fields should be more actively promoted,\u201d and that \u201cwith respect to the matter of accepting workers for so-called unskilled labor,\u201d there are some \u201cconcerns.\u201d \u00a0This stance remains unchanged, even in the Basic Policy on Employment that the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare established in February 2008.<\/p>\n

      However, in tandem with the upturn of the Japanese economy in the late 1980s, labor \u201cinflow pressures\u201d surged from neighboring countries, while \u201crecruitment pressures\u201d for migrant workers strengthened as small and medium sized domestic companies \u2013 many of which were labeled as 3D (Dirty, Dangerous, and Demanding) companies \u2013 were having difficulty securing Japanese workers.\u00a0 As a result, the number of migrant workers entering Japan increased.\u00a0 Various structural changes within Japanese society \u2013 increasing wage disparities between Japan and neighboring Asian countries, an aging domestic society, the decline in the population of youth, shifts in work values, etc. \u2013 paints the backdrop for these changes.\u00a0 However, because the government strictly held on to its aforementioned stance, many migrant workers could not secure working visas, and by entering Japan on short-term visas (e.g. tourist visas) to work, many continued to reside in Japan even after their visas expired and became \u201cillegal foreign workers\u201d and \u201coverstay foreigners.\u201d \u00a0Some of these individuals have come to live and settle in Japan and many have married and have children who attend Japanese elementary and secondary schools.<\/p>\n

      In response to these circumstances, in 1989, the Japanese government revised the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act[4]<\/a> and implemented the following measures:<\/p>\n

      (a)\u00a0\u00a0 The establishment of new regulations to punish employers who hire non-Japanese nationals that do not possess residence statuses that permit work (up to 3 years of imprisonment and up to 2 million yen in fines; approximately $20,000 USD) in aim to strengthen measures to prevent the entry of unauthorized workers;<\/p>\n

      (b)\u00a0 The provision of permission for entry to non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent (as well as their descendants and those individuals who have previously renounced their Japanese nationality) by issuing \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence statuses that have no restrictions on type of work \u2013 skilled or unskilled \u2013 so that they can be utilized as labor; and<\/p>\n

      (c)\u00a0\u00a0 The establishment of the \u201cindustrial trainee and technical intern system\u201d that mixes training with employment, so that trainees and technical interns can be utilized as labor.\u00a0 It is important to note that as trainees are not workers and are therefore not protected under the Labor Standards Law, many cases have been reported where they have been forced into de facto slave labor.<\/p>\n

      As a result of these policy changes, between 1990 and 2008, the number or \u201cNikkeijin\u201d (i.e. non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent) \u2013 mostly from Brazil and Peru \u2013 increased from 71,000 to 370,000, and individuals with \u201ctraining\u201d and \u201cdesignated activities\u201d residence statuses, including \u201ctrainees\u201d and \u201ctechnical interns,\u201d increased from 3,000 to 121,000.\u00a0 These individuals became the de facto \u201cunskilled foreign workers\u201d in Japan.\u00a0 During the same period, the total number of migrant workers increased from 260,000 to 900,000, and came to compose 1.4% of Japan\u2019s total working population of 66,500,000.<\/p>\n

      With regard to \u201coverstay foreigners,\u201d the number peaked in 1993 at 296,000, and since then has declined to 113,000 by 2009.\u00a0 The following measures underlie this trend:<\/p>\n

      (a)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 With the 1998 revision to the Immigration Control Act, the Japanese government newly established the \u201cillegal (over)stay crime,\u201d which made staying in Japan upon illegal entry\/landing and\/or overstaying, a crime that is subject to punishment.\u00a0 Furthermore, for those deported, the landing denial period (for re-entry) was extended from one year to five years (effective as of February 2002).<\/p>\n

      (b)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 In its 2004 \u201cAction Plan for the Realization of a Society Resistant to Crime\u201d the government set a goal to halve the number of \u201cillegal foreigners\u201d within 5 years.\u00a0 Additionally, in order to reach this goal, the government revised the Immigration Control Act by (1) steeply increasing fines for \u201cillegal entry\u201d (from 300,000 yen to 3,000,000 yen, or $3,000 USD to $30,000 USD); (2) extending the landing denial period for individuals with a history of deportation to 10 years; (3) establishing the \u201cDeparture Order System\u201d where the landing denial period for qualifying individuals[5]<\/a> would be shortened to one year; and 4) establishing the \u201cResidence Status Revocation System.\u201d[6]<\/a><\/p>\n

      (c)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Under the name of terrorism prevention, in 2008, the government revised the Immigration Control Act and established obligatory measures for non-Japanese nationals entering Japan to provide biometric personally-identifying information (i.e. fingerprints and face images).\u00a0 Additional measures were also made for the deportation of non-Japanese national terrorists and the establishment of obligations for captains of in-bound aircraft and maritime vessels to report passenger and crewmember registries to immigration inspectors in advance.<\/p>\n

      Furthermore, to supplement these measures, a \u201cforeigner crime\u201d campaign that utilizes select (and convenient) data to \u201cprove\u201d the \u201cincrease in heinous crimes by foreigners\u201d has been carried out by the National Police Agency.<\/p>\n

      Through the combination of these government measures to tighten control over non-Japanese national residents and the campaigns carried out by the National Police Agency, a push has been made for schemes attempting to encourage ordinary Japanese citizens into assuming \u201cmonitoring roles\u201d to weed out \u201cillegal\u201d non-Japanese national residents from local communities.\u00a0 In contrast, nowhere can measures and attempts to \u201cprevent racial discrimination\u201d be glimpsed from these extant policies.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Various Problems and Challenges that Migrants and Migrant Workers Face<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      In Japan, there is a substantial number of people who hold discriminatory sentiments and feelings of superiority towards other Asian people.\u00a0 In the 19th<\/sup> century, when most countries in the Asia region were colonized by Western powers, Japan, following the semantical scheme of \u201cleaving Asia and entering the West\u201d after the Meiji Restoration, joined the ranks of Western countries.\u00a0 Through the colonization of Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, and entry into the League of Nations as a member state, a sense of superiority for having developed into a military superpower that invaded China and Southeast Asia emerged.\u00a0 After World War II, another sense of superiority \u2013 one premised on the \u201cindustriousness\u201d of the Japanese people that catapulted Japan into an economic superpower \u2013 formed the foundation for a mentality that viewed \u201cthe weak, poor, and backward Asia\u201d as an object of scorn.<\/p>\n

      In March 2003, the Ministry of Justice announced the \u201cThird Basic Plan for Immigration Control,\u201d but even in this, there is no change in the government\u2019s basic stance regarding the national interest-based recruitment of and increased control over non-Japanese nationals in Japan.<\/p>\n

      Furthermore, due to the global recession that swept throughout the world after fall of 2008, there has been a sudden increase in the number of unemployed.\u00a0 Many of those who lost their jobs were \u201ccontingent workers\u201d \u2013 or temporary employees with one-year employment contracts and dispatched workers who worked for small manufacturing contractors.\u00a0 Already, by 2008, one in three (non-executive-level) employees was a contingent worker.\u00a0 The fact that they only earned roughly the same amount as what one would receive on livelihood assistance made it impossible for them to engage in savings, and their livelihoods took a nosedive once they lost their jobs.\u00a0 Many migrant workers worked as \u201ccontingent workers\u201d even before the economic crisis, and given the government\u2019s restrictions on the eligibility of non-Japanese nationals for social insurance and livelihood assistance, their lives were hit especially hard by unemployment.
      \nstyle=’layout-grid:18.0pt’><\/p>\n

      CHAPTER 2 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Race and Nationality-based Entrance Refusals at<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Private and Quasi-Public Establishments<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Debito ARUDOU<\/p>\n

      (Chair, NGO Foreign Residents and Naturalized Citizens Association (FRANCA))<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Introduction<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Despite the recommendation to the Japanese government by the CERD in 2001 (CERD\/C\/304\/Add.114, C.10) stating, \u201cit is necessary to adopt specific legislation to outlaw racial discrimination, in particular legislation in conformity with the provisions of articles 4 and 5 of the Convention,\u201d eight years later the Japanese Civil or Criminal Code still has no law specifically outlawing Racial Discrimination (hereinafter RD).<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Repercussions of the Absence of an Anti-RD Law<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
      Sign up at a public bathhouse in Otaru, Hokkaido, Japan; 1998-2001 (from the below-mentioned Otaru Onsens Case)<\/td>\nStandardized signs around Kabukicho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo; 2008 to present day<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Sign up at a women’s boutique on Aoyama Douri (Street), Minato-ku, Tokyo; 2005 to present day<\/td>\nStandardized signs around Hamanasu Douri, Monbetsu, Hokkaido; saying in Russian, \u201cStore Only For Japanese\u201d; 1999 to present day<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

      A lack of an Anti-RD law enables clear and present discriminatory practices in Japan, including refusals at businesses and establishments open to the general public.\u00a0 Many places, including stores, restaurants, hotels, family public bathhouses, bars, discos, an eyeglass outlet, a ballet school, an internet caf\u00e9, a billiards hall, a women’s boutique, and a newspaper subscription service, have signs out front explicitly saying \u201cJapanese Only,\u201d or using a milder exclusionary equivalent clarifying that people who are not Japanese nationals, do not look \u201cJapanese,\u201d or do not speak Japanese, are barred from entry and service.[7]<\/a> For example:<\/p>\n

      Although pressure from mostly civil society groups has resulted in some of the exclusionary signs being removed, many are still extant.\u00a0 More recently, in the case of hotels: Local government agencies[8]<\/a> and internet booking companies[9]<\/a> are even promoting establishments that explicitly \u201crefuse foreign customers,\u201d or expressly deny bookings to people who \u201ccannot speak Japanese\u201d etc. \u2013 even though this practice is unlawful under the Hotel Management Law (ryokan gyouhou<\/em>) in the Civil Code governing public accommodations.<\/p>\n

      Regarding redress for RD, in March 2001 the Japanese government replied to the CERD report (CERD A\/56\/18 (2001)) that the \u201cJapanese judicial system is [\u2026] functioning sufficiently at present\u201d (Paragraph 20.2), therefore a formalized Anti-RD law is unnecessary.\u00a0 However, judicial precedent does not support this claim.\u00a0 The Otaru Onsens Case[10]<\/a>, where several non-Japanese customers (including Japanese nationals who \u201clooked foreign\u201d) were refused entry to public bathhouses displaying \u201cJapanese Only\u201d signs, demonstrated that both the current legal situation in Japan was powerless to outlaw this practice, and that Japanese authorities were unable or unwilling to mediate effectively to stop this form of RD.\u00a0 The Otaru City Government was taken to court under the ICERD in 2001, but the case was summarily denied review by the Japanese Supreme Court (April 7, 2005) for \u201clacking any Constitutional issues,\u201d refusing to consider the validity of the ICERD.\u00a0 Sapporo District and High Court decisions (November 11, 2002 and September 16, 2004, respectively) also ruled that RD was not the illegal activity in question in this case, therefore the ICERD is immaterial.\u00a0 They also ruled that forcing the Otaru City Government to pass any local ordinance against RD would be a \u201cviolation of the separation of powers.\u201d\u00a0 A separate civil lawsuit[11]<\/a> in Daito City, Osaka, where an African-American was denied entry in 2004 to an eyeglass store explicitly because the manager \u201cdislikes black people,\u201d found the Osaka District Court ruling against the African-American plaintiff (January 30, 2006).\u00a0 Court cases take years, cost victims money, do not result in criminal penalties enforceable by police agencies, may result in civil court rulings that expressly ignore the ICERD, and otherwise absolve the government of any responsibility of systematically eliminating RD on a national level.<\/p>\n

      Although some local governments have taken measures to deal with discrimination in housing and rentals, legislation connected with RD has resulted in failure.\u00a0 The first local government (Tottori Prefecture, 2005) to pass a local ordinance that explicitly criminalized and punished behavior tantamount to RD, found itself in the rare situation of repealing<\/em> the ordinance in 2006[12]<\/a>, due to a public and media panic that too much power was being consolidated in human rights enforcement organs.\u00a0 A similar bill guaranteeing human rights (the jinken yougo houan<\/em>), first proposed at the national level in 2002, was shelved in 2003 and again in 2006 due in part to alarmist counterarguments and publications[13]<\/a> that giving human rights to non-Japanese would enable them to abuse their power over Japanese people.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Conclusion<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      In conclusion, the situation is that in Japan, racial discrimination remains unconstitutional and unlawful under the ICERD, yet not illegal.\u00a0 Japan has had more than a decade since 1996 to pass a criminal law against RD.\u00a0 Its failure to do so can only be interpreted as a clear violation of ICERD Article 2(1): \u201cStates Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay<\/span> [emphasis added<\/em>] a policy of eliminating racial discrimination.\u201d\u00a0 We urge the Committee to make the appropriate advisements to the Japanese government to pass a law against racial discrimination without any further delay.<\/p>\n

      CHAPTER 3 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Anti-Korean and Chinese Remarks Made by Public Officials<\/strong> <\/em><\/p>\n

      Nobuyuki SATO<\/p>\n

      (Research Action Institute for the Koreans in Japan (RAIK))<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Introduction<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      In the previous concluding observations adopted by the Committee (paragraph 13), the Committee addressed the \u201cSangokujin remark\u201d[14]<\/a> made in April 2000 by Tokyo Metropolitan Governor Shintaro Ishihara as being racially discriminatory, and expressed its concern over \u201cthe lack of administrative or legal action taken by the authorities.\u201d\u00a0 However, Governor Ishihara has repeatedly made discriminatory remarks in May 2001, August 2003, and September 2006.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>The \u201cSangokujin\u201d Remark<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      On April 9, 2000, Governor Ishihara conducted a speech before members of the Japan Self-Defense Force:<\/p>\n

      \u201cLooking at the present Tokyo, many Sangokujin and foreigners who have illegally entered the country have repeated very heinous crimes. [\u2026] Under such circumstances, if an extremely catastrophic disaster were to occur, we cannot discount the possibility that a huge, huge rioting incident could occur. [\u2026] This is precisely why, when dispatched in such times, I would like all of you [Self-Defense Force personnel] to consider the maintenance of public security to be one of your important purposes in addition to the provision of emergency help.\u201d[15]<\/a><\/p>\n

      Governor Ishihara has specifically stressed \u201ccrimes committed by foreigners\u201d (which only compose a very small proportion of the total crimes committed in Japan), and by intentionally using the \u201cSangokujin\u201d term \u2013 which was formerly used to discriminate against and drive out Resident Koreans and Taiwanese residents who were liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 \u2013 and creating the false threat that \u201cwe cannot discount the possibility that a huge, huge rioting incident could occur,\u201d he has tried to arouse prejudice and animosity among Japanese against non-Japanese nationals so that the dispatch of Self-Defense Force personnel for public security maintenance purposes could be realized.<\/p>\n

      Furthermore, Governor Ishihara\u2019s statement, \u201cWe need to break [China] up.\u00a0 No matter how small the contribution, Japan should assist in this process and should also take initiatives both before and after the break up,\u201d[16]<\/a> violates Article 7.\u00a0 However, Tokyo residents reelected him in 2003.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Remarks on \u201cChinese DNA\u201d<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      In a Japanese newspaper (Sankei Shimbun) article titled \u201cA Message to Japan: The Necessity of Internal Defense\u201d dated May 8, 2001, Governor Ishihara groundlessly asserted that \u201c[e]very year, there are about 10,000 illegal entrants, and Chinese compose 40% of these numbers.\u00a0 Because they are illegal entrants, they cannot land regular jobs and are inevitable criminal factors.\u201d \u00a0Additionally, after raising the example of a brutal murder case between Chinese nationals involving the scalping of facial skin, he wrote the following:<\/p>\n

      \u201cWe cannot deny the possibility that the quality of Japanese society as a whole might change as a result of the proliferation of crimes that indicate such ethnic DNA.\u00a0 To avoid turning a blind eye to future trouble, we have no choice but to do what we can do now to expel such impending threats.\u201d<\/p>\n

      This statement spread prejudiced sentiments that associated Chinese ethnic DNA (Governor Ishihara implicitly meant the Han people) to the execution of savage crimes.<\/p>\n

      Two years later, in an August 4, 2003 Sankei Shimbun (newspaper) article, Governor Ishihara wrote:<\/p>\n

      \u201cThe extremely pragmatic DNA of Chinese, who do not trust any sort of politics whatsoever, takes the improvement of one\u2019s own economic situation as an absolute purpose, and while bearing in mind the [economic] disparities [between China and Japan], invades Japan in large numbers, and openly commits theft to satisfy one\u2019s own desires.\u201d<\/p>\n

      This is an attitude meant to thoroughly demean individuals of a specific ethnicity\/nationality.<\/p>\n

      In January 2006, a report on Japan written by the UN Commission on Human Rights-appointed Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance Doudou Di\u00e8ne was released.\u00a0 The following quote was made in paragraph 62 of the report:<\/p>\n

      \u201cMost worryingly, elected public officials make xenophobic and racial statements against foreigners in total impunity, and affected groups cannot denounce such statements.\u201d<\/p>\n

      However, by stating, \u201cThe Special Rapporteur doesn\u2019t understand the governor\u2019s real meaning in the whole context of his statement,\u201d the Japanese government responded that his remarks were not discriminatory.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Conclusion<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      These statements may act to instill groundless fears about \u201cthe rampant spread of crime by Asian foreigners\u201d throughout the Japanese public and may also incite discriminatory stereotypes against particular ethnic minority groups in Japan.\u00a0 As such, by not attempting to take any corrective actions against Governor Ishihara\u2019s remarks, the Japanese government has not fulfilled its State Party obligation to uphold ICERD Article 4(c).<\/p>\n

      CHAPTER 4 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      Nationality Acquisition and Name Changes: <\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Denial of Han and Korean Ethnic Surnames through Limitations in Kanji Characters Designated for Personal Names<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Masataka OKAMOTO<\/p>\n

      (Vice Secretary-General, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Background<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      In the concluding observations adopted on March 20, 2001 (CERD\/C\/58\/Misc.17\/Rev.3), CERD stated:<\/p>\n

      \u201cNoting that although there are no longer any administrative or legal requirements for Koreans applying for Japanese nationality to change their names to a Japanese name, the Committee expresses its concern that authorities reportedly continue to urge applicants to make such changes and that Koreans feel obliged to do so for fear of discrimination.\u201d<\/p>\n

      In the Upper House Judicial Affairs Committee that immediately followed this statement, when asked to remark on the concerns and recommendations of CERD\u2019s concluding observations, Minister of Justice Masahiko Koumura replied:<\/p>\n

      \u201cIf the authorities have continued to demand applicants to change their names, this would be something outrageous, and since 1983, we have decided that such requests should not and will not be made, so if those types of cases actually do exist, we would like to take the appropriate measures.\u201d[18]<\/a><\/p>\n

      Unfortunately, \u201cthose types of cases\u201d abound.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Cases<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Even in 2003, a case was reported by a Resident Korean from the Kanto area, that when he went to the Legal Affairs Bureau and received an \u201cInformation on Naturalization Application Procedures\u201d leaflet and attended the briefing session, in response to his question, \u201cAm I not allowed to continue using my current name after I naturalize?\u201d the counseling staff replied, \u201cSince you will become a Japanese, it is necessary that you change your name to one that is Japanese.\u201d[19]<\/a><\/p>\n

      The Ministry of Justice itself has also revealed in different forms that with regard to post-naturalization \u201cnames,\u201d instead of \u201cinstructing\u201d the applicants, it has given \u201cadvice\u201d and has also urged them to \u201cconsider\u201d the implications of which type of name they choose to have.\u00a0 During the 1991 Upper House Judicial Affairs Committee, the Director-General of the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice Atsushi Shimizu stated, \u201cConsidering that it is acceptable for individuals to decide that they would like to retain and pass on last names such as \u2018\u6734\u2019 [Pak] and \u2018\u91d1\u2019 [Kim] for the next two or three generations, we have made it a point to advise applicants to carefully decide whether they would like to have such names after naturalization.\u201d[20]<\/a> Under the auspices of such government stances, the \u201cinstructing\u201d and \u201ccoaxing\u201d of Japanese name acquisition has occurred in practice.\u00a0 For example, a woman from Cambodia who acquired Japanese nationality in late 1990 testified that when she applied for naturalization, the office representative insistently encouraged her to acquire a Japanese-like name like \u201cSuzuki\u201d for the \u201cbenefit of her children.\u201d[21]<\/a> Very recently, on January 7, 2010, a Thai woman who went to the Chiba Legal Affairs Office to apply for Japanese nationality was also told by the office representative that \u201cJapanese names are more convenient,\u201d so \u201c[n]ext time, come back with a Japanese name in mind for when you acquire Japanese nationality.\u201d[22]<\/a><\/p>\n

      In tandem with the aforementioned incidents, even in 2005, an administrative scrivener accounted that, through his experiences handling naturalization applications, among applicants who decide on Japanese names as their naturalized names, many actually \u201cprefer to apply with their Korean ethnic names,\u201d but many Korean residents think that \u201cthe Legal Affairs Bureau and the Ministry of Justice implicitly demand the use of Japanese names,\u201d and if they do not use such Japanese names when they apply, \u201cthey would be at a disadvantage in the naturalization application process.\u201d[23]<\/a> A guidebook published by a different administrative scrivener in the same year also states that for \u201cpost-naturalization names,\u201d one must choose a \u201cJapanese-like name\u201d (i.e. a name that is \u201cappropriately\u201d Japanese).\u00a0 This is the reality of the issue in Japan.<\/p>\n

      Even the Ministry of Justice\u2019s most recent (2009) \u201cGuidebook for Naturalization Procedures\u201d uses language that persuades name changes by stating that \u201cone may freely choose […] what name he\/she would like to use after naturalization,\u201d and in addition to this, limitations are placed by stating, \u201cIn principle, names for use after naturalization cannot contain characters other than hiragana and katakana letters and those characters listed in the National List of Chinese Characters in Common Use and the List of Kanji Officially for Use in Names.\u201d \u00a0Because characters such as \u201c\u5d14\u201d (Cu\u012b\/Choi), \u201c\u59dc\u201d (Ji\u0101ng\/Kang), \u201c\u8d99\u201d (Zh\u00e0o\/Cho), and \u201c\u5c39\u201d (Y\u01d0n\/Yoon) that are frequently used in Korean and Han ethnic surnames are not even listed in these two lists, there are still many ethnic Korean and Han applicants who have no choice but to renounce their ethnic surnames.<\/p>\n

      In a magazine interview, a third generation Chinese man in Japan who applied for naturalization in 1997 was asked, \u201cWere you forced to take a Japanese name?\u201d\u00a0 In response, the man replied \u201cno,\u201d but said, \u201cI was told that my name after naturalization must include characters in the List of Kanji Officially for Use in Names, and my surname character was not in the list.\u201d[24]<\/a> A former Chinese national who acquired Japanese nationality in 1998-99 claimed, \u201cI really like the name that my parents gave me, so it was painful to have to change it to get naturalized.\u00a0 I wish I could have retained my name, even after becoming a Japanese national.\u201d[25]<\/a> If we consider the fact that the majority of applicants for naturalization are Korean and Chinese\/Taiwanese nationals, it is likely that since 1983, a substantial number of people were forced to renounce their ethnic names, due to the limitations imposed by the List of Kanji Officially for Use in Names.<\/p>\n

      Given the fact that the aforementioned characters for common ethnic Korean and Han surnames are commonly used on the computer and are also entered into the system during \u201cforeign resident registration\u201d procedures, there is nothing logical about not allowing their use in names for the family register in Japan.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Conclusion<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      In its 2004 General Recommendation 30, CERD recommended that State Parties should \u201c[t]ake the necessary measures to prevent practices that deny non-citizens their cultural identity, such as legal or de facto requirements that non-citizens change their name in order to obtain citizenship, and to take measures to enable non-citizens to preserve and develop their culture\u201d (paragraph 37).<\/p>\n

      Therefore, the Japanese government should first eliminate the limitations imposed by the List of Kanji Officially for Use in Names, and allow ethnic Korean and Han applicants to retain their original Chinese character surnames when acquiring Japanese nationality.\u00a0 The \u201cGuidebook for Naturalization Procedures\u201d should also refrain from using language that persuades applicants to change their names when naturalizing.\u00a0 Additionally, on the application form, there should not be a column for \u201cname after naturalization.\u201d\u00a0 Even under the current law, Japanese nationals wishing to change their names are required by Article 107 of the Family Registration Law to file a request to a family court.\u00a0 Nationality acquisition and name changes are intrinsically unrelated issues.<\/p>\n

      CHAPTER 5 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      The Education of the Children of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities<\/strong><\/p>\n

      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Yasuko MOROOKA<\/p>\n

      (Japanese Network for the Institutionalization of Schools for<\/p>\n

      Non-Japanese Nationals and Ethnic Minorities)<\/p>\n

      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Education of Non-Japanese National Children<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      1. Despite the recommendation made in paragraph 7 of the Committee’s previous concluding observations, the central government has not conducted a nationwide survey on non-Japanese national and\/or ethnic minority children.\u00a0 According to the various surveys carried out by the local governments,[26]<\/a> 60% of the children of migrants and migrant workers such as Nikkei-Brazilians, Nikkei-Peruvians, and Filipinos among others (mostly with non-Japanese nationalities) are reported to be attending Japanese public schools, while 20% attend schools for non-Japanese national children (gaikokujin gakkou<\/em>), and the remaining 20% are estimated not to be attending school at all.\u00a0 On the other hand, among the children of the 600,000 non-Japanese national Korean residents, 80 to 90% are reported to be attending Japanese schools and the rest attend schools for non-Japanese national or ethnic minority children, such as North Korean and South Korean schools.\u00a0 The majority of the children of the 500,000 Korean Japanese (i.e. Japanese national ethnic Koreans) are reported to be attending Japanese schools.<\/p>\n

      2. Regardless of the statement made in paragraph 15 of the Committee’s previous concluding observations, non-Japanese national children living in Japan are still excluded from the compulsory education system, and in violation of Article 5(e)(v) of the Convention, the right to education is not equally ensured at the same level as that of Japanese children.\u00a0 In its \u201cThird, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Combined Periodic Report,\u201d[27]<\/a> the Japanese government announced that \u201cJapanese public schools at the compulsory education level guarantee foreign nationals the opportunity to receive education if they wish to attend such [a] school by accepting them without charge, just as they do with Japanese school children\u201d (paragraph 24), but this simply means that \u201cpermission\u201d will be given if the non-Japanese national \u201cwishes\u201d to enroll.\u00a0 However, the school\/administration does not have the legal obligation to accept such students, and for non-Japanese nationals, education is not \u201csecured\u201d as a legal \u201cright.\u201d\u00a0 This is the actual situation regarding the government\u2019s contention.[28]<\/a> For example, the annual \u201cSurvey on Children of School Age Who Do Not Attend School\u201d carried out by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), clearly states that \u201cforeigners are excluded from the survey.\u201d<\/p>\n

      The extent to which information is adequately disseminated \u2013 including translation of information into the non-Japanese nationals\u2019 languages \u2013 for those \u201cwishing\u201d to enter Japanese schools varies among local governments.<\/p>\n

      As for the percentage of students continuing on to higher education, according to the 2001 survey conducted by the Council for Cities of Non-Japanese Residents (where many Brazilians and non-Japanese nationals live), the average of the 14 local government areas in which non-Japanese national children were enrolled in Japanese schools was 51.6%.\u00a0 Though there is no data on student enrollment rates into Japanese high schools from schools for non-Japanese national or ethnic minority children, since there are almost no considerations in the high school entrance examination system that cater to the needs of students whose first language is not Japanese, it is clear that such enrollments are extremely difficult.\u00a0 Consequently, the percentage of children of migrants and migrant workers who go on to high school is estimated to be below 30%.\u00a0 This figure is less than one-third of 97% high school enrollment rate of Japanese nationals in 2008.<\/p>\n

      3. In paragraph 24 of the government\u2019s report[29]<\/a>, the government states:<\/p>\n

      \u201cFurthermore, when these foreign children enter school, maximum attention is given to ensure that they can receive, without undue difficulty, the education in Japanese normally taught to Japanese children.\u00a0 Toward this end, they are provided with, among other things, guidance in learning Japanese and are supported by their regular teachers as well as by others who can speak their native language.\u201d<\/p>\n

      However, this contradicts reality.\u00a0 Even according to the survey conducted by MEXT, as of September 2008, there were 28,500 students enrolled in Japanese elementary, junior high, and high schools that needed Japanese language instruction, and this number has continued to increase annually.\u00a0 Compared to the previous year, there was an increase of 12.5%.\u00a0 Furthermore, due to the fact that measures to accommodate Japanese language instruction are not taken unless there are 5 or more students who need such instruction, 15.1% of these students are not receiving any Japanese language instruction.\u00a0 Besides, in the aforementioned MEXT-commissioned survey on children of school age who do not attend school, 12.6% of the children not attending school answered that they did not attend because they \u201cdid not understand Japanese.\u201d\u00a0 It is evident from this that there is not enough Japanese language instruction.[30]<\/a><\/p>\n

      4. In response to the Committee\u2019s recommendation to \u201censure access to education in minority languages in public Japanese schools\u201d in paragraph 16 of its previous concluding observations, the government claimed that \u201ca school subject called sogo-gakushu <\/em>(general learning) [\u2026] allows [\u2026] children of foreign nationalities [to] receive education in their native tongues (minority languages) and learn about their native cultures\u201d[31]<\/a> (paragraph 24).\u00a0 However, the government has not established any specific education policies for minority children, and within MEXT\u2019s curriculum guidelines for this \u201cgeneral learning\u201d subject, there is neither any mention of minority language and culture education nor any financial support for such classroom activities.\u00a0 As the choice over the content of the \u201cgeneral learning\u201d subject\/class period is left to the discretion of each school, the government\u2019s claim simply means that this class period could, in theory<\/em>, be used for minority language and culture education.<\/p>\n

      The public schools that do provide minority language and culture classes are those that have been established in specific areas in Osaka prefecture and Kyoto City with \u201cethnic classrooms.\u201d\u00a0 Because these classes are not recognized as accredited classes by the central government\u2019s educational curriculum policy, they are taught as once-a-week extracurricular classes that include Korean language and culture education.\u00a0 However, the salaries of the lecturers\/instructors of these \u201cethnic classrooms\u201d are paid fully by the local municipalities, and compared to regular full-time teachers, their pay is very low.\u00a0 In addition to these schools, there are only a few schools that offer mother tongue language education in \u201cspecial support\u201d classes for Chinese and Brazilian children.<\/p>\n

      Over 80% of the children of Korean residents who attend Japanese schools use Japanese names instead of their real names,[32]<\/a> and are placed in situations in which they have no other option but to conceal their own identities.\u00a0 From this, it is obvious how deficient the current education system is in terms of the provision of a curriculum that not only respects the identities of minority children, but enables them to hold pride in their ancestral roots.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Schools for Non-Japanese National and Ethnic Minority Children<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      1. Today, there are about 200 schools for non-Japanese national and ethnic minority children that offer general education in languages other than Japanese.\u00a0 These include 100 national and international schools such as North Korean, South Korean, and Chinese schools that were established before the war or during the early years after the war.\u00a0 Brazilian, Peruvian, and Filipino schools that were established as the numbers of migrant workers and migrants started to rapidly increase in the 1990s number about 100 as well.[33]<\/a><\/p>\n

      2. According to the School Education Act, for a school to become recognized as an accredited school, it must implement the designated subjects set forth in the curriculum guidelines created by MEXT (for the purpose of educating Japanese nationals), and must use MEXT-approved Japanese textbooks.\u00a0 Due to this, it is impossible to adequately teach languages other than Japanese and English in regular classes.\u00a0 Therefore, such schools are not recognized as accredited schools.\u00a0 Even if a student were to graduate from one of these schools, his\/her graduation credential would not be recognized as an accredited one.\u00a0 As a result, such students encounter various disadvantages when they try to enroll in Japanese schools or take national examinations.<\/p>\n

      3. In 2003, the college entrance qualification system was revised.\u00a0 With this, for (1) individuals graduating from twelve-year curriculum schools for non-Japanese national children (e.g. international schools) that have been accredited by international evaluation associations (WASC, ACSI, and ECIS); and (2) individuals graduating from schools for non-Japanese national children (South Korean, Chinese, Brazilian schools, etc.) that have been recognized by the Japanese government as schools that carry out curriculums that are equivalent to high school curriculums in each respective country, eligibility to take the entrance examinations and apply for Japanese universities and technical\/vocational schools was granted.\u00a0 However, graduates of North Korean schools were not included, and because their eligibility is either dependent on the individual decisions of each university or conditional on passing the Senior High School Graduate Equivalence Qualifying Examination, they experience disadvantages.<\/p>\n

      4. Most schools established before the 1990s for non-Japanese national and ethnic minority children, such as North and South Korean schools and Chinese schools, have been recognized as \u201cmiscellaneous category schools\u201d (kakushu gakkou<\/em>).\u00a0 But these schools are not \u201cofficial\u201d or \u201caccredited\u201d ordinary schools under the Japanese Educational School System whose aim is to provide general or regular education, and are therefore, educational institutions that are institutionally treated no differently from vocational driving or cooking schools.\u00a0 Because they are not \u201cofficially accredited\u201d schools, the central government has provided no subsidies for these schools for non-Japanese national children.\u00a0 Instead, it is only from the subsidies provided by certain portions of the local municipalities\u2019 budgets that these schools are funded.\u00a0 However, these subsidies from local municipalities only amount to one-tenth to several fractions of the funding received by Japanese private schools.\u00a0 Due to the absence of state subsidies, these schools are supported by tuition fees paid by the parents, donations from co-ethnics, and subsidies from local municipalities.<\/p>\n

      As for donations made to schools, \u201cofficial\u201d or \u201caccredited\u201d general schools can unconditionally receive special tax breaks, but \u201cmiscellaneous category schools\u201d are in principle, ineligible.\u00a0 On March 31, 2003, MEXT approved tax exemption measures for donations that were specific to a portion of European\/American \u201cmiscellaneous category schools\u201d with English curriculums.\u00a0 In response to this, concrete recommendations for the equal treatment of North Korean and Chinese schools were made to the Japanese government by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) in March 2007 and by the UN Human Rights Committee in October 2008.[34]<\/a><\/p>\n

      5. Among the Brazilian and Peruvian schools that have increased after 1995, only 5 schools have been approved as \u201cmiscellaneous category schools\u201d and the majority are only treated as mere \u201cprivate preparatory schools.\u201d\u00a0 Due to this, (1) there are no subsidies from local municipalities, (2) consumption tax is placed on tuition, (3) students are ineligible for discounted student commuter passes, (4) students cannot participate in inter-school sports events and activities, etc.\u00a0 Such schools experience great difficulties in operating the school itself.<\/p>\n

      Above all, because the schools\u2019 running costs are almost completely secured by tuition fees paid by the parents, monthly tuition fees are inevitably expensive and range from 30,000 to 50,000 yen (approximately $300 to $500 USD).\u00a0 Furthermore, in addition to tuition, the parents must also pay for textbooks, school lunch fees, school bus passes and\/or non-discounted adult-rate commuter passes, etc.<\/p>\n

      Strict requirements, such as the private possession of school grounds and buildings, are enforced by local municipalities for the approval of \u201cmiscellaneous category schools.\u201d\u00a0 It is very difficult for newly established Brazilian and Peruvian schools to pass such criteria.<\/p>\n

      Most of the parents of students who attend these schools are contingent\/dispatch workers, and have been hit extremely hard by the Lehman Shock of September 2008.\u00a0 For example, in half a year, approximately 60% of Brazilian migrant workers lost their jobs, and as a result, in one year, 16 Brazilian schools closed down because parents were no longer able to pay the expensive tuition and had to withdraw approximately half of the students from school.\u00a0 Half of the students who withdrew from school returned to Brazil, but 22% still remain completely out of school in Japan.<\/p>\n

      \u3010<\/strong>Recommendations<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

      1. The government should confirm that it has an international legal obligation to ensure the right to education regardless of residence status and nationality.<\/p>\n

      2. The government should establish an education policy to secure the right to education for non-Japanese national and ethnic minority children in Japan.\u00a0 The content of the policy should first and foremost, respect the children\u2019s identities and ensure the right to learn minority languages and cultures; and secondly, it should ensure the right to learn Japanese if a child\u2019s first language is not Japanese.\u00a0 Additionally, in order to establish a concrete education policy, the voices of non-Japanese national and ethnic minority residents themselves should be directly sought, and a detailed nationwide survey should be carried out on the realities of language development, rates of non-attendance, acceptance rates into top tier schools, costs of educational fees, economic situations of the parents, etc., and disaggregated by nationality, ethnicity, sex, and age.<\/p>\n

      3. In order to ensure the right to education for non-Japanese national and ethnic minority children, and in particular, the right to learn one\u2019s language and culture, the government should allow these children to actually exercise choice between Japanese schools and schools for non-Japanese national and ethnic minority children by recognizing these schools as a type of \u201cofficially accredited\u201d ordinary school (and not as \u201cmiscellaneous category schools\u201d) and allowing the recognition of these schools\u2019 graduation credentials as ones that are equivalent to those of Japanese schools while providing these schools with at least the same amount of government funding that Japanese private schools receive.\u00a0 Additionally, until such fundamental policy reforms are established, the government should immediately amend the unfair policies extant within the current \u201cmiscellaneous category schools\u201d framework with regard to tax exemption measures on donations and the differential recognition of college entrance eligibility between different schools for non-Japanese national and ethnic minority children.\u00a0 Finally, the government should take immediate actions to bail out schools that are not even recognized as \u201cmiscellaneous category schools,\u201d and in particular, Brazilian and Peruvian schools that are at risk of closing down.<\/p>\n

      CHAPTER 6 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      Discriminatory Administrative Government Procedures in<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Residence Status Application Approval Procedures and Employment<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Satoru FURUYA<\/p>\n

      (Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK))<\/p>\n

      Kaoru KOYAMA<\/p>\n

      (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. 1. <\/strong>The Requirement to Present Proof of a Clean Criminal Record for Residence Status Approval: The Additional \u201cGood Behavior and Conduct\u201d Criterion for Third Generation Non-Japanese Nationals of Japanese Descent and Their Families<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        <\/strong><\/p>\n

        \u3010<\/strong>Introduction<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

        In November 2005, there was an incident where a Japanese girl was murdered in Hiroshima.\u00a0 One week later, a Peruvian man \u2013 who had a \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence status (i.e. visa) as a third generation non-Japanese national of Japanese descent \u2013 was arrested.\u00a0 On March 29, 2006, as a measure to both deal with this incident and maintain general public security, the Ministry of Justice added a \u201cgood behavior and conduct\u201d requirement \u2013 a requirement stating that one must prove not to have a criminal record for the approval of \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence statuses.<\/p>\n

        In other words, instead of taking measures to mitigate racial prejudices that could have resulted from the media\u2019s excessive reports on crimes committed by non-Japanese nationals, the Ministry of Justice \u2013 which should be protecting human rights \u2013 did the opposite by enforcing a measure that was predicated on the linkage of crime to non-Japanese nationals with certain attributes.\u00a0 As a result of this, members of minority groups became targets of racial discrimination, and stereotypes against them were widely spread throughout Japanese society.<\/p>\n

        Therefore, this measure violates Articles 2(1(a)) and 4(c) of the ICERD.\u00a0 Additionally, in lawsuits related to this, the defendant (the Japanese government) has argued that this new requirement does not violate the ICERD, and a district court verdict has supported this claim.<\/p>\n

        \u3010<\/strong>Background<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

        With the 1989 revision to the Immigration Control Act, non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent and their families were issued \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence statuses that allowed one to engage in remunerative activities.\u00a0 To second generation non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent, there was the \u201cspouse or child of a Japanese national\u201d residence status, and for the spouses of second generation non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent and third generation non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent and their spouses and\/or unmarried minor children, there was the \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence status.\u00a0 According to statistics on the number of \u201cregistered foreigners\u201d in Japan, in 2008, there were 258,000 individuals with \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence statuses of which 137,000 were Brazilian and 19,000 were Peruvian.<\/p>\n

        On the other hand, with regard to public security policy, a trend toward \u201cpenal populism\u201d has recently become salient in Japan, and non-Japanese national residents have been the first to be targeted.\u00a0 Discourse claiming that crimes have increased in number and level of atrocity thereby leading to the critical deterioration of public security throughout society at large, has circulated among the media, police, and Diet, and took a turn for the worse, creating a dangerous situation which peaked in 2003 but continued to exist as several murder incidents were extensively broadcasted in 2005.\u00a0 The aforementioned incident in Hiroshima where a non-Japanese national was said to have \u201cmurdered a Japanese girl for sexual motivations\u201d was one of those extensively broadcasted incidents.<\/p>\n

        Under these circumstances, by stating that (1) due to this incident, there is \u201cheightened anxiety among the Japanese people,\u201d and (2) there are many foreigners[35]<\/a> with \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence statuses who have been arrested for criminal offenses,[36]<\/a> the Ministry of Justice announced the amendment to the \u201cOfficial Gazette Regarding \u2018Long-term Residents\u2019\u201d that will be discussed in this chapter.\u00a0 Subsequently, this amendment and the reasons behind it were picked up and broadcasted by the media.<\/p>\n

        \u3010<\/strong>The Content of the \u201cOfficial Gazette\u201d Amendment<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

        The amendment to the Ministry of Justice\u2019s \u201cofficial gazette\u201d (announced in March 2006) regarding \u201clong-term residents\u201d contains the following criteria:<\/p>\n

        (a)\u00a0\u00a0 \u201cGood behavior and conduct\u201d was added as an additional criterion for qualifying as a \u201clong-term resident.\u201d\u00a0 In concrete terms, possession of a criminal record of imprisonment (with or without hard labor) and\/or pecuniary offenses (i.e. fines; but excluding fines from violations of the Road Traffic Law) within or outside of Japan reflects negatively on one\u2019s application.\u00a0 Probation under the Juvenile Law and having a record of \u201crepeated violations of the law throughout one\u2019s everyday life\u201d are also evaluated negatively.<\/p>\n

        (b)\u00a0 To verify \u201cgood behavior and conduct,\u201d when applying for landing permission or residence status, applicants are asked to present background records issued by the police in their respective home countries.<\/p>\n

        (c)\u00a0\u00a0 This new \u201cgood behavior and conduct\u201d criterion is applied to third generation non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent and their families, mainly from South America.\u00a0 In other words, of all the non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent and their families, second generation non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent and their spouses are exempt.\u00a0 From the differential treatment here, it is obvious that there is a standard of judgment with racist motivations borne from distrust and public security anxieties toward individuals that are \u201cless akin\u201d to Japanese nationals.\u00a0 Additionally, among those who qualify as \u201clong-term resident\u201d applicants, the \u201cJapanese war orphans left behind in China\u201d and Indochinese refugees were exempt from this new criterion due to policy considerations.<\/p>\n

        Possession of a criminal record is a criterion that forecloses the possibility of residence status approval in general, and can also be used as a reason for deportation (under the Immigration Control Act).\u00a0 For such instances, being sentenced to \u201ca year or more\u201d of imprisonment or a crime involving drugs become reasons for adverse disposition for disapproval of residence status.\u00a0 In contrast to this, in the case of this amendment to the \u201cofficial gazette\u201d regarding \u201clong-term residents,\u201d all criminal punishments as well as minor punishments and juvenile probation become reasons for rejection.\u00a0 Although the presentation of background records issued by the police of the applicant\u2019s home country is not required in regular screenings for residence status approval, the amended \u201cofficial gazette\u201d demands the presentation of such documentation for the aforementioned \u201clong-term resident\u201d applicants, and therefore, even background activities that fall short of criminal record offenses[37]<\/a> are also available for consideration and could work against the applicants.<\/p>\n

        \u3010<\/strong>The Discriminatory Effects and Cultivation of Stereotypes Caused by the \u201cOfficial Gazette\u201d Amendment<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

        All of the following cases occurred after the amendment to the \u201cofficial gazette\u201d was made, and involve \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence status extension applications that were rejected because the applicant had been punished for a prior offense.<\/p>\n

        (a)\u00a0\u00a0 Third generation male Peruvian national of Japanese descent, A, caused a traffic accident, and in a 2002 summary court ruling, was charged with professional negligence resulting in bodily injury and was fined on a summary order.\u00a0 The following year, his residence status extension was approved, and the next year, his license was approved.\u00a0 However, after the \u201cofficial gazette\u201d amendment, in August 2006 his residence status extension was rejected on the grounds of the aforementioned offense.\u00a0 Furthermore, A\u2019s wife, who was also living in Japan with a \u201clong-term resident\u201d residence status also had her extension application rejected.<\/p>\n

        (b)\u00a0 A male Bolivian national, B, who is married to a third generation Bolivian woman of Japanese descent, caused a traffic accident, and his residence status extension application was rejected on the grounds that he was charged with a pecuniary offense for professional negligence resulting in bodily injury.[38]<\/a><\/p>\n

        There are also cases in which the possession of a spouse or minor child has been considered, ultimately resulting in the approval of residence status extension applications despite the fact that one has a prior criminal record.\u00a0 However, in the two aforementioned cases, such considerations were not adequately made.[39]<\/a><\/p>\n

        (c)\u00a0\u00a0 In October 2002, a third generation male Peruvian national of Japanese descent, C, dumped a refrigerator in an empty lot, and in January 2003, was fined 200,000 yen (approximately $2,000 USD) on a summary order by the summary court for \u201ca violation of the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law.\u201d\u00a0 In August 2003, his residence status extension was approved.\u00a0 However, in August 2006, after the \u201cofficial gazette\u201d amendment, his extension was rejected on the grounds of the same pecuniary offense, and since his \u201cperiod of preparation to leave Japan\u201d ended in October of the same year, he has remained in Japan without legal documentation.<\/p>\n

        In August 2007, C brought charges claiming the invalidity of his residence status extension rejection, but lost the case in the district court.\u00a0 He is currently residing in Japan without legal documentation, and no remedies have been sought.<\/p>\n

        In court, the plaintiff claimed that the \u201cofficial gazette\u201d amendment not only \u201cposes a significantly grave discriminatory effect on the entire Nikkeijin [non-Japanese nationals of Japanese descent] population as a group that has been categorized on the basis of race and other attributes,\u201d but also embodies the racial discrimination stipulated in ICERD Article 1(1) while violating Articles 2(1(a)) and 4(c).<\/p>\n

        Additionally, this \u201cofficial gazette\u201d amendment has promoted the entrenchment of media-instigated stereotypes that link non-Japanese nationals to crime.\u00a0 Wide-scale coverage and explanations that linked the amendment to the murder incident in Hiroshima and other crime statistics were made by the Minster of Justice in a press conference the day before the \u201cofficial gazette\u201d was amended, as well as on the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau\u2019s homepage (since April 2006), the official announcement in the aforementioned Immigration Control Report<\/em> (footnote 1), and the media.<\/p>\n

        \u3010<\/strong>Conclusion<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

        Therefore, this measure violates ICERD Articles 2(1(a)) and 4(c).<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. 2. <\/strong>Employer Obligations to Report the Employment Status of \u201cForeign Workers\u201d and the Use of \u201cOrdinary Powers of Attention\u201d to Ascertain Who is a \u201cForeign National\u201d<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          \u3010<\/strong>The Problem<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

          With the recent revision of the Employment Measures Act, since October 2007, the government made it mandatory for employers when hiring non-Japanese nationals to confirm and notify the head of the local public employment security office of their names, residence statuses, and lengths of stay.\u00a0 A punishment of up to 300,000 yen (approximately $3,000 USD) for violating employers was also established.<\/p>\n

          When hiring, employers are required to ascertain whether a job applicant is a \u201cforeign national\u201d by means of using one\u2019s \u201cordinary powers of attention\u201d to make judgments based on the applicant\u2019s \u201cname or native language.\u201d[40]<\/a><\/p>\n

          As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report (p.3), there has been a rapid increase in Japanese nationals who have ethnic roots in other parts of the world.\u00a0 To require employers to judge applicants by their names is predicated on the assumption that Japanese nationals all have Japanese-like names, but this assumption contradicts the Ministry of Justice\u2019s claim that it does not demand that non-Japanese nationals change their names upon naturalization (for more details, see Chapter 4).\u00a0 In reality, there are also many Japanese nationals whose native language is not Japanese.<\/p>\n

          Instead of providing employers with a means for differentiation between Japanese nationals and non-Japanese nationals, this new guideline poses the risk of facilitating segregation as well as arbitrary judgment and discrimination on the basis of race, skin color, and ethnic\/tribal origins.<\/p>\n

          \u3010<\/strong>Conclusion<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

          Therefore, this measure violates ICERD Articles 2(1) and 4(c).<\/p>\n

          CHAPTER 7 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

          <\/strong><\/p>\n

          Migrant Women in Japan: Victims of Multiple Forms of Discrimination and Violence and the Government\u2019s Lack of Concern<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

          Leny TOLENTINO<\/p>\n

          (KALAKASAN Migrant Women Empowerment Center)<\/p>\n

          \u3010<\/strong>Introduction<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

          Japan has continuously needed migrant women for its sex industry, shortage of wives for its male nationals, and replacement unskilled labor for its service and manufacturing industries.\u00a0 In response to these needs, migrant women \u2013 mostly from Asia and Latin America \u2013 have come or have been brought to Japan on tourist, entertainer, spouse or relative of a Japanese national (Nikkeijin), and trainee visas since the 1980s.<\/p>\n

          However, even after nearly three decades, many migrant women are still treated as the \u201cother\u201d and excluded from Japanese society and its social safety nets.\u00a0 Widespread discriminatory attitudes and prejudices on the basis of appearance, speech, customs, and cultures, as well as feelings of indifference toward migrant women among government officials and the populace continue to exist and are also codified in extant policies and legislation.\u00a0 Many migrant women survive with minimal protection under the law, have limited access to basic information and opportunities for training, empowerment, and development, and are also almost completely deprived of opportunities to participate in decision-making processes.\u00a0 Most vulnerable are those migrant women who are victims of DV and\/or trafficking.<\/p>\n

          \u3010<\/strong>Multiple Forms of Discrimination and Disadvantages That Migrant Women Face<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. 1. <\/strong>In Trafficking <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            (a)\u00a0\u00a0 Recent Developments in Policy<\/p>\n

            The government adopted the Comprehensive Action Plan of Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2004), which was followed by amendments to the penal code (2005) and the Immigration Standard Ministerial Ordinance (2006) \u2013 regarding the cut down of \u201centertainer\u201d visa issuances \u2013 and an amendment to the Entertainment Business Law (2005).<\/p>\n

            Yet, in response to stricter regulations, trafficking operations have simply become more invisible, coercive, and controlling, and there has been a tangential increase in migrant women who are lured to come to Japan with non-entertainer visa statuses \u2013 such as tourist, trainee, and marriage visas \u2013 and are later forced to go into prostitution by their husbands or brokers.\u00a0 In some instances, if they enter into fake marriages, they are forced to pay both<\/em> the broker and the husband for 2 to 3 years, or as long as the fake marriage lasts.\u00a0 A typical case in point would be a Filipino woman who wanted to end her marriage with her abusive Japanese husband.\u00a0 He had assured her legal stay in Japan as his wife for a monthly fee of 50,000 yen (approximately $500 USD) but refused her divorce request because she had not finished paying the 3 million yen ($30,000 USD) she had agreed to pay him.[41]<\/a><\/p>\n

            2.\u00a0 In Domestic Violence<\/strong><\/p>\n

            (a)\u00a0\u00a0 Examples of DV in International Marriages<\/p>\n

            International marriages in Japan have been increasing since the 1980s,[42]<\/a> and domestic violence remains a major problem for non-Japanese women in such marriages where they are six times<\/em> more likely to be abused than Japanese women (Table 1).\u00a0 DV often originates from their partners\u2019 prejudices against migrant women and from their low regard for people from developing countries.\u00a0 Aside from life endangering physical and sexual abuse, threats and derogatory judgmental insults inflict psychological damage and lower self-esteem and confidence.\u00a0 Threats like, \u201cYou cannot live in Japan without me,\u201d \u201cI will not extend your visa,\u201d and \u201cThis is Japan, and custody over the child will always be mine [husband] \u2013 if you leave, I will report it to the immigration authorities and they will not believe what you say,\u201d are examples of such derogatory treatment that have been reported to KALAKASAN over the past 7 years. \u00a0Their lives are sometimes circumscribed by their spouses\u2019 intent to force them to \u201cbecome Japanese\u201d by being over-critical of the way they rear and discipline their children, and by prohibiting them from speaking their own language inside the house and associating with co-ethnics.<\/p>\n

            Table 1. Percentage of DV Victims per 100,000 People[43]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n
            <\/td>\n2003<\/td>\n2004<\/td>\n2005<\/td>\n2006<\/td>\n2007<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Non-Japanese women<\/td>\n28.9<\/td>\n33.8<\/td>\n36.0<\/td>\n34.8<\/td>\n35.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Japanese women<\/td>\n6.2<\/td>\n6.5<\/td>\n6.3<\/td>\n6.5<\/td>\n6.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

            (b)\u00a0 Current Policy Limitations<\/p>\n

            There is a dire need for gender- and multiculturalism-sensitive training programs for government staff and interpreters at all levels of the government to assume responsibility for supporting migrant women victims so that victimization is not repeated.<\/p>\n

            In 2007, 8.95% of women in protective custody at women\u2019s counseling centers were non-Japanese women.[44]<\/a> Though the DV Law guarantees protection to all women victims, undocumented migrant women and their children are minimally protected, and are only eligible to stay in a shelter for two weeks, and are excluded from long-term support and particularly access to livelihood assistance and other support services.\u00a0 At the same time, it takes months or years before undocumented DV victims and their children are granted residence permits in Japan.\u00a0 Relegated to an even lower social existence are undocumented migrant women without children or those who have children who are in the custody of the abusive partner.\u00a0 Such women are frequently forced to go back to their country of origin.\u00a0 For such reasons, a significant number of undocumented migrant women and children choose to bear abuses, or if they are already in a shelter, to return to their violent partners or become homeless.[45]<\/a> Many of these women do not have understandable and accessible information about support services and details about their legal and human rights.\u00a0 It is therefore paramount that the government effectively disseminates such information in a systematic and culturally sensitive way.<\/p>\n

            3.\u00a0 Migrant Single Mother Families <\/strong><\/p>\n

            (a)\u00a0\u00a0 Lack of Support and Information Services<\/p>\n

            Every year, the number of migrant single mother families is increasing as international marriage divorce rates increase.\u00a0 In 2007, 7.15% of all divorces in Japan were international marriage divorces.[46]<\/a> Migrant single mother families face many difficulties and are marginalized due to the government\u2019s lack of interest to provide them with adequate protection.\u00a0 Migrant single mothers have often experienced discrimination and abuse or abandonment from their partners and\/or in-laws, and report such experiences as the main reasons for the divorce or separation.[47]<\/a><\/p>\n

            4.\u00a0 Discriminatory Policy and Unfair Court Procedures<\/strong><\/p>\n

            (a)\u00a0\u00a0 Repercussions of the Revised Immigration Control Act (July 2009) on the Livelihoods of Migrant Women<\/p>\n

            The fact that visa extensions for migrant women often depend on the will and discretion of their Japanese husbands and whether or not the woman has Japanese children, makes their legal standing and livelihood stability in Japan very precarious and vulnerable to the whims of their spouses and the government.\u00a0 Unfortunately, the government passed an amendment to the Immigration Control Act in July 2009, specifying that migrant women must report any changes to their livelihood situations like changes in address and workplace.\u00a0 Individuals who fail to do this within 14 days are subject to a fine, and failure to do anything for 3 months could result in visa cancellation.\u00a0 This revision could escalate fear among migrant women \u2013 especially those who are married to or living with an abusive Japanese partner \u2013 and would allow Japanese husbands to take advantage of their vulnerabilities thereby putting them in more risk of being abused, while making it more difficult for DV victims to seek rescue and protection.<\/p>\n

            (b)\u00a0 Indifference Among Government and Court Officials<\/p>\n

            A migrant woman who escaped from the abuse and maltreatment of her husband and in-laws who is presently undergoing court procedures for the custody of her child and divorce, was denied a visa extension even with a note from her lawyer stating that she was in the middle of settling a divorce case.\u00a0 When she verbally appealed to the immigration officer, she was called a liar.\u00a0 It was not until her lawyer accompanied her that she was considered.[48]<\/a> From this example, we can see that the court also uses the unstable visa statuses of migrant women as bases for giving custody of the child to the Japanese spouse, thereby denying the woman of the same right to custody, simply because she is \u201cnon-Japanese.\u201d\u00a0 There are many other migrant women who experience similar situations.<\/p>\n

            (c)\u00a0\u00a0 Lack of Means to Claim Rights and Obtain Public Assistance<\/p>\n

            Furthermore, under the revised immigration law, undocumented residents can no longer claim any public services and assistance through the local municipality offices in the areas in which they live.\u00a0 Before a local municipal office assumes the responsibilities of accepting a registrant\u2019s child into a local school, extending public assistance to migrant women, etc., it requires one to prove his\/her residence in the area.\u00a0 Proving and registering one\u2019s residence is possible if one obtains a Resident Card from the immigration authorities, but these cards are only issued to \u201clegal\u201d migrants.\u00a0 The exclusion from local municipal registration therefore means the denial of rights and exclusion from public assistance.\u00a0 Many undocumented migrants are women who are former wives of Japanese nationals, and are pregnant with or live with children who were born between them and their Japanese partners but have not received official recognition from the father, due to the father\u2019s failure or refusal to do so.\u00a0 It is these people who are put at risk the most by the revised law.<\/p>\n

            \u3010<\/strong>NGO Recommendations: Summary of Overarching Problems, How They Violate ICERD, and How They are Relevant to the Committee\u2019s List of Issues<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong><\/p>\n

            Though migrant DV victims, trafficked victims, and single mothers each experience distinct hardships and require policy improvements that are tailored to eradicate the relevant forms of discrimination and disadvantages that they face, five common sources for these problems exist:<\/p>\n

              \n
            1. The lack of a comprehensive policy that protects the social, economic, cultural, and human rights of migrants, and in particular, migrant women<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              In violation of Article 2, and in cross-reference to paragraphs 2, 6, 9, and 14 in the Committee\u2019s List of Issues:<\/p>\n

              l\u00a0 Currently, within the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society (which is the national gender equality policy), there is no clause that refers to the considerations that must be made to ensure gender equality for migrant women.\u00a0 We recommend that within the current deliberations over the Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality, there should be an independent clause that addresses measures to be taken to ensure gender equality for migrant and minority women in Japan so that they can possess peace of mind, freedom, and dignity in employment, livelihood, and social participation without being subject to violence, discrimination, and prejudice.\u00a0 In addition to measures to eradicate DV and trafficking, specific measures for the protection, empowerment, and relief of DV and trafficked victims should be clearly stated in this clause.\u00a0 Additionally, the government should guarantee permission for NGOs and civil society groups to participate in these deliberations and processes.<\/p>\n

                \n
              1. Existence of discriminatory policies or policies that disadvantage migrant women in practice<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                In violation of Articles 2 and 5, and in cross-reference to paragraphs 6, 7, 9, and 14 in the Committee\u2019s List of Issues:<\/p>\n

                l\u00a0 The revised Immigration Control Act newly states that status of residence can be revoked for \u201c[f]ailing to continue to engage in activities as a spouse while residing in Japan for more than 6 months,\u201d and for \u201c[f]ailing to register the place of residence within 90 days after newly entering or leaving a former place of residence in Japan.\u201d[49]<\/a> Such obligations endanger the safety and legal standings of DV victims and their children who intend to flee or have fled from abusive spouses to live separately, and must therefore be eliminated.<\/p>\n

                l\u00a0 Before the revision, non-Japanese national residents \u2013 regardless of the type or legality of their residence status \u2013 were entitled to receiving a local municipality-issued Alien Registration Card if they could provide proof of residence within that local municipality.\u00a0 This entitled non-Japanese national residents to receive national health insurance and livelihood support services.\u00a0 However, the new revision abolishes the Alien Registration Card, replacing it with the Residence Card issued and managed by the central government.\u00a0 Changes in address and workplace must now be reported to local immigration control offices, and failure to do so could result in fines or the revocation of one\u2019s residence status.\u00a0 Residence Cards are issued to \u201cproper foreign residents\u201d at the discretion of the Minister of Justice, and therefore, undocumented residents and asylum seekers are ineligible.\u00a0 To receive health and livelihood support in the new system, one must be registered in the newly created Basic Register for Foreign Residents, but registration for this basic registry is contingent on possessing a Residence Card.\u00a0 In sum, the new revision works as a catch-22 to exclude the most vulnerable migrants \u2013 undocumented (women) migrants (many of whom are DV and trafficked victims) \u2013 from social services, and must be reevaluated and immediately revised.<\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. Indifference and discriminatory attitudes among public officials (e.g. at immigration control offices, police offices, courts, etc.)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  In violation of Articles 2, 4, 6, and 7, and in cross-reference to paragraph 20 in the Committee\u2019s List of Issues:<\/p>\n

                  l\u00a0 Given the multiple reoccurrences of insensitive, discriminatory, and disadvantageous comments, actions, and attitudes of public officials, sensitivity training on human rights, diversity, and multiculturalism should be more strictly implemented.<\/p>\n

                    \n
                  1. Lack of government efforts to establish services to assist, educate, empower, and protect migrant women and their families<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    In violation of Articles 2 and 5, and in cross-reference to paragraphs 15 and 22 in the Committee\u2019s List of Issues:<\/p>\n

                    l\u00a0 Although some social and medical services exist for migrant and minority women as well as DV and trafficked victims, they are inadequate (e.g. understaffed and lacking in personnel who possess the necessary professional, linguistic, and cultural knowledge to adequately assist migrant women).\u00a0 Furthermore, information on support services and the rights that migrant women are entitled to are not adequately disseminated and often do not reach migrant women.\u00a0 Even if they do, many forms of information are either not detailed enough, or are presented in Japanese.\u00a0 These inadequacies must be addressed.<\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. Limited government collection and disclosure of crucial statistics concerning migrant women<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                      In violation of Article 7, and in cross-reference to paragraphs 12 and 13 in the Committee\u2019s List of Issues:<\/p>\n

                      l\u00a0 The government neither collects nor discloses adequate vital statistics that are necessary for the government and the public to assess the current situation of the wellbeing of migrant women in Japan.\u00a0 For example, the government collects statistics on non-Japanese nationals and residents, but not on individuals who have naturalized (i.e. ethnic minorities with Japanese nationality).\u00a0 It is possible that such individuals also encounter disadvantages and discrimination, but as of now, there is no systematic way to find out if they do.\u00a0 In order to develop a more comprehensive and sensitive plan or policy for the protection, integration, and empowerment of migrant women, the Gender Equality Bureau should conduct an in-depth study on the situation and causes of difficulties migrant women face, based on more detailed disaggregated data and in consultation with migrant women support groups.<\/p>\n

                      <\/strong><\/p>\n


                      \n<\/strong><\/p>\n

                      CHAPTER 8 <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong> <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

                      <\/strong><\/p>\n

                      Racial Discrimination within the Refugee Recognition System<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

                      <\/strong><\/p>\n

                      Kenji IWATA<\/p>\n

                      (Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK))<\/p>\n

                      <\/strong><\/p>\n

                      \u3010<\/strong>Introduction<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

                      The Japanese government\u2019s long-standing reluctance to give protection to asylum seekers has been criticized domestically and internationally.[50]<\/a> The \u201crefugee recognition system\u201d is at best, only ostensibly racism-neutral, and in violation of Articles 2(1(a)) and 5(a), it suffers from unfairness caused by systematic racism that stems from the discriminatory dispositions of the decision makers involved.\u00a0 More specifically, the government lacks in its efforts to:<\/p>\n

                        \n
                      1. adequately disseminate information regarding the refugee recognition process;<\/li>\n
                      2. provide adequate language assistance during the application and appeals processes;<\/li>\n
                      3. provide adequate human rights training to its staff; and<\/li>\n
                      4. implement effective measures to monitor racially discriminatory biases within the system so that the individual racial prejudices of immigration officials and government appointed actors in the refugee recognition process will not be systematically reflected in the outcomes of such procedures.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                        In addition to paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, and 22, and in specific relation to paragraphs 10[51]<\/a>, 15, and 20 in the Committee\u2019s List of Issues (CERD\/C\/JPN\/Q\/3-6), we would like to bring to the Committee\u2019s attention, several defining examples of the aforementioned violations to the Convention.<\/p>\n

                        \u3010Specific Cases of Procedural Malpractices and Negligence<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

                        Case 1 (July 7, 2009)<\/span>:<\/p>\n

                        In 2009, a refugee examination counselor[52]<\/a> reviewed the testimonies of a Tamil asylum seeker who claimed that he had fled Sri Lanka after his house was shot by suspected LTTE members.\u00a0 In response to this, and to the surprise of the asylum seeker and his lawyer, the counselor concluded that the attack to the asylum seeker\u2019s house did not constitute a direct threat to his life.\u00a0 It is disconcerting that the counselor was an honorary professor of a prestigious university in Osaka, Japan, and although many wonder why he was selected as a refugee examination counselor, there is no way to find out because the government does not disclose information on the selection criteria for examination counselors.<\/p>\n

                        Case 2 (November 20, 2006)<\/span>:<\/p>\n

                        The following statement made in 2009 by another Tamil asylum seeker from Baticaloa, Sri Lanka, was documented by an immigration official, but even a cursory glance through the statement reveals blatant contradictions and inconsistencies resulting from communication difficulties between the official and the asylum seeker and the official\u2019s indifference to the asylum seeker\u2019s claims:<\/p>\n

                        \u201cI intended to flee [Sri Lanka] and go to Canada, where my elder brother stayed for asylum because the hostilities between the military and the LTTE have been exacerbated. [\u2026] I did not flee the country because I was targeted due to my political opinion, ethnicity, food practices, or religion, and I am not a Convention refugee.\u00a0 I would like to go back to Sri Lanka without applying for refugee status here.\u201d[53]<\/a><\/p>\n

                        The asylum seeker is still having great difficulties communicating in English, and it is likely that in the interview, the asylum seeker could only randomly juxtapose the limited English vocabulary that he had.\u00a0 In the conversation between the asylum seeker and the official, it is highly unlikely that there was any interaction in English about the applicability of the Convention\u2019s definition for refugees to his case.\u00a0 This is apparent in the blatant contradictions in the testimonial of this asylum seeker who claimed that he spent a great sum of money to go to Canada for asylum, only to instantly confess that he was not a refugee, abandon his attempt to claim refugee status, and return to the battlefields of Baticaloa.\u00a0 Of course, the official did not and will not confess his indifference or any underlying racist sentiments he may have had.\u00a0 Additionally, during the interview, it is unlikely that he used any racist language.\u00a0 However, his apparent negligence of his duty to accurately communicate with a potential refugee in a language that is well understood by the asylum seeker, and his complete indifference to the highly apparent and inconsistent content of the interview illuminates the racist tendencies he may have had.<\/p>\n

                        Case 3 (May 16, 2006)<\/span>:<\/p>\n

                        Another Sri Lankan man, who could not speak Japanese, was surprised to find out that his interview record stated that he had said in Japanese, that he had overstayed in Japan to earn the necessary money to pay back his debts.\u00a0 The interview records prepared in advance by the immigration officials as a part of the deportation procedures often serve as convenient excuses for denying the credibility of the claims of asylum seekers.\u00a0 For example, immigration officials will claim that the asylum seeker initially did not report that he\/she was a refugee, and that only later was a claim made for fear of persecution in the home country.<\/p>\n

                        <\/strong><\/p>\n

                        These kinds of procedural malpractices have never been questioned by the refugee counselors.\u00a0 Regrettably, some refugee counselors also harbor similar racist sentiments, prejudices, and preconceptions \u2013 as demonstrated by the counselor in Case 1.\u00a0 Prejudiced assumptions that asylum seekers are disguised economic migrants often override their ability to make fair judgments and pay serious attention to the provision of due process to the claims presented before them.<\/p>\n

                        \u3010<\/strong>The Passive Stance of the Japanese Government<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

                        Although the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees requests signatory states, including Japan, to provide protection to refugees and asylum seekers, the Japanese government has long neglected efforts to make the interview process comply with the due process requirements concerning adequate communication and the verification over whether the examiners\u2019 decisions are made in the \u201cspirit of justice and understanding\u201d consistent with the UNHCR\u2019s established guidelines.<\/p>\n

                        The Japanese refugee recognition system is formalized by law.\u00a0 But in reality, there are many informal and clandestine \u201ctraps\u201d for making refugee status claims fail.\u00a0 For example, the Ministry of Justice has yet to publish detailed information on the refugee recognition process on its website,[54]<\/a> and the Immigration Bureau (which is part of the Ministry of Justice) has never spent a fraction of its billion yen budget to directly inform potential asylum seekers of the system to encourage them to voluntarily apply for refugee status.\u00a0 Therefore, many asylum seekers only come to understand the recognition system only after having lived in Japan for many years.\u00a0 This delay serves as another excuse for denying the seriousness of the asylum seekers\u2019 applications.\u00a0 As such, without the dissemination of such information, many asylum seekers are being subject to deportation procedures and are being misled into giving up their untold rights before they come to understand the system.\u00a0 Additionally, their contradictory behavior and statements before immigration officials that arise from the lack of information or communication difficulties are conveniently used to defame and delegitimize their refugee claims.\u00a0 In sum, the de facto \u201cno information policy\u201d embodies the \u201cinformality\u201d of Japan\u2019s refugee recognition system.<\/p>\n

                        \u3010<\/strong>Disproportionate Recognitions as a Sign of Non-methodological Recognition Methods<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

                        The unreasonably disproportionate recognition of Burmese asylum seekers as refugees is also a reflection of the whimsical nature of Japan\u2019s current refugee recognition process.\u00a0 In 2008, 1,599 individuals applied for refugee status, of which 954 were Burmese nationals, accounting for 61% of the total.\u00a0 However, in the same calendar year, 417 individuals were granted refugee status or visas on humanitarian grounds, and the overwhelming majority, or 382, were Burmese asylum seekers, accounting for 92% of all applicants recognized.[55]<\/a> Of course, from these statistics alone, we cannot deduce whether immigration officials prefer Burmese asylum seekers over others, but with little doubt, we can see the systematic disregard that both the current refugee recognition and appeals process as well as the immigration officials and refugee examination counselors have of the methodologically established procedures that are stated in the UNHCR handbook on criteria for determining refugee status (HCR\/IP\/4\/Eng\/REV.1).[56]<\/a> Given this disregard, the system risks lacking the impartiality of a fair recognition process that does not discriminate on the basis of race.<\/p>\n

                        \u3010<\/strong>Conclusion and NGO Recommendations<\/strong>\u3011<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n

                        In sum, in addition to being victims of racist prejudices held by individuals within the Japanese populace, non-Japanese nationals including refugees and asylum seekers in Japan are also vulnerable to systematic and structural racism that is embedded within various institutional and legal frameworks such as the refugee recognition and appeals system.\u00a0 In addition to making the system more transparent by passing legislation that will allow the videotaping of all interviews during refugee recognition and deportation processes and providing the right for all stakeholders to retrospectively verify all procedures to determine their sincere compliance with the internationally established refugee review procedures, the Japanese government must also be held responsible for the provision of:<\/p>\n

                          \n
                        1. language considerations that ensure accurate communication between asylum seekers and immigration officials;<\/li>\n
                        2. the dissemination of information regarding the refugee recognition and appeals process and one\u2019s rights through posters, brochures, and websites;<\/li>\n
                        3. comprehensive human rights training programs for government staff\/officials; and<\/li>\n
                        4. more stringent initiatives to monitor, detect, and rectify unlawful and racially discriminatory acts within detention facilities and review\/court procedures.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          CREDITS<\/strong><\/p>\n

                          <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

                          Report contributors (member organizations)<\/span><\/strong>:<\/strong><\/p>\n

                          FOREWORD<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Ralph Hosoki<\/p>\n

                          (Division of International Human Rights, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 1<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Kaoru Koyama<\/p>\n

                          (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          Masataka Okamoto<\/p>\n

                          (Vice Secretary-General, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 2<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Debito Arudou<\/p>\n

                          (Chair, NGO Foreign Residents and Naturalized Citizens Association (FRANCA))<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 3<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Nobuyuki Sato<\/p>\n

                          (Research Action Institute for the Koreans in Japan (RAIK))<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 4<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Masataka Okamoto<\/p>\n

                          (Vice Secretary-General, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 5<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Yasuko Morooka<\/p>\n

                          (Japanese Network for the Institutionalization of Schools for Non-Japanese Nationals and Ethnic Minorities)<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 6<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Satoru Furuya<\/p>\n

                          (Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK))<\/p>\n

                          Kaoru Koyama<\/p>\n

                          (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 7<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Leny Tolentino<\/p>\n

                          (KALAKASAN Migrant Women Empowerment Center)<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 8<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Kenji Iwata<\/p>\n

                          (Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK))<\/p>\n

                          Editors<\/span><\/strong>:<\/strong><\/p>\n

                          Ralph Hosoki<\/p>\n

                          (Division of International Human Rights, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          Nobuyuki Sato<\/p>\n

                          (Research Action Institute for the Koreans in Japan (RAIK))<\/p>\n

                          Masataka Okamoto<\/p>\n

                          (Vice Secretary-General, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          Translator<\/span><\/strong>:<\/strong><\/p>\n

                          Ralph Hosoki<\/p>\n

                          (Division of International Human Rights, Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ))<\/p>\n

                          [1]<\/a> \u201cOldcomer\u201d refers mainly to the Koreans and Chinese (and their descendants) who came (in many cases by means of force) to Japan prior to the end of the war, and remained in Japan.\u00a0 In contrast, \u201cnewcomer\u201d refers to more recent non-Japanese nationals who have come to Japan and settled in and after the 1980s.<\/p>\n

                          [2]<\/a> \u201cReturnees from China\u201d refer to war-displaced people left behind in China by their Japanese relatives after World War II who returned to Japan in the 1980s.<\/p>\n

                          [3]<\/a> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Combined Periodic Report on the Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Japan.<\/em> Retrieved January 18, 2010, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/policy\/human\/race_rep3.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [4]<\/a> The Act was passed in 1989 and came into effect on June 1, 1990.<\/p>\n

                          [5]<\/a> An \u201coverstayer\u201d qualifies if he\/she voluntarily turns him\/herself in to one of the immigration offices for deportation, and does not have prior records of deportation\/use of the Departure Order System and\/or imprisonment after entry into Japan.<\/p>\n

                          [6]<\/a> This new rule stipulates that one\u2019s residence status may be revoked if the individual is found to have submitted false statements or documents and\/or if the individual has not engaged in the activities corresponding to those of the residence status issued for three or more months without justifiable reason.<\/p>\n

                          [7]<\/a> Primary source materials archived at www.debito.org\/roguesgallery.html<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [8]<\/a> For example, Fukushima Prefectural Tourist Information Association listed \u201cNo Foreigner\u201d hotels on their official website; 2007-2010 (see http:\/\/www.tif.ne.jp\/<\/a>).<\/p>\n

                          [9]<\/a> Arudou, D. (2009). \u201cJapanese Speakers Only\u201d Kyoto Exclusionary Hotel Stands by its Rules.<\/em> Retrieved November 10, 2009, from Debito.org website: www.debito.org\/?p=4879<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [10]<\/a> Arudou, D. (2006). \u201cJapanese Only\u201d: The Otaru Hot Springs Case and Racial Discrimination in Japan.<\/em> Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.<\/p>\n

                          [11]<\/a> The Japan Times. (2006, 2 7). Twisted Logic Deals Rights Blow to Foreigners. The Japan Times<\/em> .<\/p>\n

                          [12]<\/a> The Japan Times. (2006, 5 2). How to Kill a Bill: Tottori\u2019s Human Rights Ordinance is a Case Study in Alarmism. The Japan Times<\/em>.<\/p>\n

                          [13]<\/a> For example: Jinken Yougo Houan wo Kangaeru Shimin no Kai (Citizens\u2019 Group for Thinking about the Human Rights Protection Bill). (2006). Abunai! Jinken Yougo Houan: Semarikuru Senshinkokukei Zentai Shugi no Kyoufu (Danger! The Human Rights Protection Bill and the Impending Threat of the Totalitarianism of the Developed Countries).<\/em> Tokyo: Tendensha.<\/p>\n

                          [14]<\/a> \u201cSangokujin\u201d literally means \u201cthird-country nationals,\u201d and is a term which came into use after the war and often connotes derogation and prejudice against individuals \u2013 such as Resident Koreans and Taiwanese residents and their descendants \u2013 from former Japanese colonies.<\/p>\n

                          [15]<\/a> Quote taken from an April 11, 2000 Mainichi Daily News article<\/p>\n

                          [16]<\/a> Bungeishunju. (2003). Shokun!<\/em> Tokyo: Bungeishunju.<\/p>\n

                          [17]<\/a> Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations Office at Geneva. (2006). Comments on the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Mr. Doudou Di\u00e8ne.<\/em> Retrieved January 20, 2010, from the IMADR website: http:\/\/www.imadr.org\/en\/pdf\/Noteverbale.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [18]<\/a> In a \u201ccomment\u201d made by the government in August 2001 in response to CERD\u2019s recommendations, the government claimed, \u201c[T]here is no fact in the claim that the authorities are urging individuals applying for Japanese nationality to change their names, but instead, the authorities are extensively informing applicants that they can freely determine their post-naturalization names.\u201d<\/p>\n

                          [19]<\/a> Hangetsujou. (2003). Gendaiban no Soushi-kaimei (The Modern Soshi-kaimei Policy). Hangetsujou Tsuushin, 97<\/em>.<\/p>\n

                          [20]<\/a> Ijichi, N. (1994). Zainichi Chosenjin no Namae (The Names of Resident Koreans in Japan).<\/em> Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.; Also, the following source states in its section on \u201cNames after Naturalization\u201d that, \u201cNewly established names from naturalization will be passed on to one\u2019s descendants, and it is necessary for applicants to take serious consideration of this.\u201d (Ministry of Justice Bureau of Ethnography Fifth Division Research Committee for Nationality Matters (Houmushou Minzokukyoku Dai Go Ka Kokuseki Jitsumu Kenkyuukai) (Ed.). (1990). Shintei Kokuseki\/Kika no Jitsumu Soudan (New and Revised Edition: Nationality and Naturalization Consultations).<\/em> Tokyo: Nihon Kajo Shuppan.)<\/p>\n

                          [21]<\/a> Yoon, C. (n.d.). Yi Chojya no Sawayaka Intabyuu: Pen Setarin San (Yi Chojya\u2019s Fresh Interview with Penn Setharin). Niji no You Ni<\/em> , 1<\/em>.<\/p>\n

                          [22]<\/a> Input from Toako Matsushiro (member of hand-in-hand Chiba (Chiba Group for Holding Hands with Foreign Residents in Japan))<\/p>\n

                          [23]<\/a> Tazawa International Administrative Scrivener Office. (2005). Kikago no Shimei ni tsuite Omou Koto: Zainichi Korian no Katagata no Kika Shinsei wo Otetsudai Shiteite (Thoughts about \u201cName Changes after Naturalization\u201d: Through Helping Resident Koreans with Their Naturalization Applications)<\/em>. Retrieved February 2005, from Tazawa International Administrative Scrivener Office website: http:\/\/www.tazawa-jp.com\/office\/kikago-shimei.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [24]<\/a> Zheng, Y. (1998). Kikasha he no Intabyuu (1) \u201cZainichi Chuugokujin 3 Sei\u201d (Interviews with Individuals Who have Naturalized (1) \u201cA Third-generation Resident Chinese\u201d)<\/em>. Retrieved December 2009, from Nihonseki Korian Mainoriti no Hiroba (Plaza for Japanese National Korean Minorities): http:\/\/www.geocities.jp\/yonamugun\/intabyu1.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [25]<\/a> Asakawa, A. (2003). Zainichi Gaikokujin to Kika Seido (Resident Foreigerns in Japan and the Naturalization Process).<\/em> Tokyo: Shinkan Sha.<\/p>\n

                          [26]<\/a> According to a 2007 MEXT-commissioned survey on non-Japanese national children conducted by 13 cities and 1 prefecture with high percentages of newcomer non-Japanese national residents, 61% of non-Japanese national children attended Japanese schools, 21% attended schools for non-Japanese national children, 1.1% did not attend school at all, and 17.5% were \u201cunknown.\u201d\u00a0 It is estimated that a large portion of these \u201cunknown\u201d respondents are also not attending school.\u00a0 However, according to this study, even Kani City in Gifu prefecture, which has taken the most progressive measures to leave no non-Japanese national child behind, had a non-attendance rate of 7% in 2006.<\/p>\n

                          [27]<\/a> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Combined Periodic Report on the Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Japan.<\/em> Retrieved January 18, 2010, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/policy\/human\/race_rep3.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [28]<\/a> \u201cWith regard to the implementation of compulsory education for foreigners, no such imperative exists in the Constitution and Basic Education Law. [\u2026] As long as the individual is a foreigner, no obligation arises to send the child to elementary or junior high school.\u201d (Suzuki, I. (Ed.). (2006). Chikujyou Gakkou Kyouiku Hou (Clause-by-Clause Review of the School Education Act).<\/em> Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo.)<\/p>\n

                          [29]<\/a> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). Ibid.<\/p>\n

                          [30]<\/a> Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. (2007). Gaikokujin no Kodomo no Fushuugaku Jittai Chousa no Kekka ni Tsuite (On the Results of the Study on the Situation of Non-attendance Among Foreign Children)<\/em>. Retrieved January 10, 2010, from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology website: http:\/\/www.mext.go.jp\/a_menu\/shotou\/clarinet\/003\/001\/012.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [31]<\/a> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). Ibid.<\/p>\n

                          [32]<\/a> Kyoto City Foreigner Education Project and Kyoto City Education Board (Kyoutoshi Gaikokujin Kyouiku Purojekuto and Kyoutoshi Kyouiku Iinkai). (2008). Gaikokuseki oyobi Gaikoku ni Ruutsu wo Motsu Jidou Seito ni Kansuru Jittai Chousa no Matome (Summary of the Study on the Situation of Foreign National Students and Students with Foreign Roots).<\/em> Retrieved September 19, 2008, from the Kyoto City website: http:\/\/www.city.kyoto.lg.jp\/kyoiku\/cmsfiles\/contents\/0000059\/59348\/zittait.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [33]<\/a> As of October 2007, there were 96 Brazilian schools, 5 Chinese\/Taiwanese schools, 73 North Korean schools, 4 South Korean schools, 2 Peruvian schools, 2 German schools, 1 Indian school, 1 Indonesian school, 1 Turkish school, 1 Filipino school, 1 Amerasian school, 1 French school, and 24 international schools in Japan. (2007 Forum for Multiethnic Co-existence Education in Tokyo Executive Committee (Taminzoku Kyousei Kyouiku Foramu 2007 Toukyou Jikkou Iinkai). (2007). 2007 Forum for Multiethnic Co-existence Education in Tokyo Information Packet. 2007 Forum for Multiethnic Co-existence Education in Tokyo Executive Committee.)<\/p>\n

                          [34]<\/a> On March 24, 2007, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations submitted a recommendation to the Prime Minister and Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology \u201cconcerning the human rights redress petition for discriminatory treatment regarding the application of designated donations to Chinese and North Korean schools.\u201d (Japan Federation of Bar Associations. (2008). Kankokusho (Recommendation).<\/em> Retrieved January 10, 2010, from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations website: http:\/\/www.nichibenren.or.jp\/ja\/opinion\/hr_case\/data\/080324.pdf<\/a>);<\/p>\n

                          Additionally, in paragraph 31 of its concluding observations, the Human Rights Committee also issued a recommendation of the same nature to the Japanese government in October 2008. (United Nations Human Rights Committee. (2008). Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee (Japan).<\/em> Retrieved January 10, 2010, from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website: http:\/\/www2.ohchr.org\/english\/bodies\/hrc\/docs\/co\/CCPR-C-JPN-CO.5.doc<\/a>)<\/p>\n

                          [35]<\/a> Besides claiming that there are \u201cmany\u201d who were arrested, no further analyses have been conducted.\u00a0 Such comments only serve to create vague impressions and are misleading.<\/p>\n

                          [36]<\/a> From a press conference with the Minister of Justice (March 28, 2006), Internet official government announcements, the 2006 Immigration Control Report<\/em>, etc.\u00a0 However, the English version of the 2006 Immigration Control Report<\/em> does not make reference to point (1). (Ministry of Justice. (2006, 3 28). Daijin Kakugigo Kisha Kaiken no Gaiyou (Summary of the Post-cabinet Meeting Minister News Conference).<\/em> Retrieved November 24, 2009, from the Ministry of Justice website: http:\/\/www.moj.go.jp\/kaiken\/point\/sp060328-01.html<\/a>; Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau. (2006). 2006 Immigration Control Report.<\/em> Retrieved November 24, 2009, from the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau website: http:\/\/www.moj.go.jp\/NYUKAN\/nyukan54-3.pdf<\/a>)<\/p>\n

                          [37]<\/a> This refers to crimes that have been recorded in police records, but not recorded in legal criminal records.<\/p>\n

                          [38]<\/a> The Yomiuri Shimbun (The Yomiuri Newspaper). (2007, 6 23). \u201cTeijyuusha\u201d Biza Koushin wo Keishou Jiko Riyuu ni Fukyoka: Nikkei Kazoku \u201cSabetsu\u201d to Teiso\/Toukyou Chisai (Minor Injury Accident as Reason for \u201cLong-term Resident\u201d Visa Extension Rejection: \u201cDiscrimination\u201d Against a Nikkei Family and Lawsuit\/Tokyo District Court). The Yomiuri Shimbun<\/em>.<\/p>\n

                          [39]<\/a> However, in both cases, by claiming changes to their personal (or spousal) relationships to Japanese nationals or reapplying, both individuals were eventually able to obtain residence statuses.<\/p>\n

                          [40]<\/a> Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (2008). For Foreign Nationals Wishing to Work in Japan (Nihon de Hatarakou to suru Gaikokujin no Minasama he).<\/em> Retrieved January 3, 2010, from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare website: http:\/\/www.mhlw.go.jp\/bunya\/koyou\/gaikokujin12\/pdf\/english.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [41]<\/a> From an informal sharing with a victim by a KALAKASAN staff member (2009)<\/p>\n

                          [42]<\/a> Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (2009). Annual Number of Marriages by Nationality of Husband and Wife.<\/em> Retrieved January 20, 2010, from the Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan: http:\/\/www.e-stat.go.jp\/SG1\/estat\/List.do?lid=000001057779<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [43]<\/a> Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (2009). Population by Year and Sex.<\/em> Retrieved January 21, 2010, from the Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan: http:\/\/www.e-stat.go.jp\/SG1\/estat\/List.do?lid=000001057781<\/a>;<\/p>\n

                          Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau. (2004-2008). Number or Registered Foreigners.<\/em> Retrieved January 21, 2010, from the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau website: http:\/\/www.immi-moj.go.jp\/toukei\/index.html<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [44]<\/a> Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (2008). 2008 Government Information Session for the National Research Commitee for Counselors at Facilities for the Protection of Women.<\/em> Retrieved January 20, 2010, from the Welfare and Medical Service Network System: http:\/\/www3.wam.go.jp\/wamappl\/bb16GS70.nsf\/0\/806448c690707b914925750500052b90\/$FILE\/20081117_2shiryou1.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [45]<\/a> Experiences from cases handled by KALAKASAN<\/p>\n

                          [46]<\/a> Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (2009). Annual Number and Percentages of Divorces by Nationality of Husband and Wife.<\/em> Retrieved January 20, 2010, from the Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan:<\/p>\n

                          http:\/\/www.e-stat.go.jp\/SG1\/estat\/List.do?lid=000001057780<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [47]<\/a> Experiences from cases handled by KALAKASAN<\/p>\n

                          [48]<\/a> This is one of the cases that KALAKASAN started handling in 2009.<\/p>\n

                          [49]<\/a> Immigration Bureau of Japan. (2009). Changes to the Immigration Control Act.<\/em> Retrieved January 10, 2010, from the Immigration Bureau website: http:\/\/www.immi-moj.go.jp\/newimmiact\/pdf\/leaflet_english.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [50]<\/a> Isozaki, Y. (2002). Questioning Japan\u2019s \u201cClosed Country\u201d Policy on Refugees.<\/em> Retrieved November 1, 2009, from the Iwanami Shoten website: http:\/\/www.iwanami.co.jp\/jpworld\/text\/ClosedCountry01.html<\/a>; Japan Federation of Bar Associations. (2002). Toward the Reform of the Refugee Recognition System<\/em>. Retrieved November 1, 2009, from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations website: http:\/\/www.nichibenren.or.jp\/en\/activities\/meetings\/20021201.html<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [51]<\/a> No financial assistance is granted to persons with refugee status, although some refugee applicants receive under 100,000 yen (about $1,000 USD) per month for a limited period during their administrative refugee review process.<\/p>\n

                          [52]<\/a> Refugee examination counselors are third-party part-time public servants (on two year contracts) who serve as observers\/advisors during appeals to refugee recognition denials. (also see: Ministry of Justice. (2006). Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act<\/em>. Retrieved November 1, 2009, from the Ministry of Justice website: http:\/\/www.moj.go.jp\/ENGLISH\/information\/icrr-20.html<\/a>)<\/p>\n

                          [53]<\/a> Interview document disclosed by the Immigration Bureau in 2007<\/p>\n

                          [54]<\/a> Ministry of Justice. (n.d.). Ministry of Justice Home Page<\/em>. Retrieved November 1, 2009, from the Ministry of Justice website: http:\/\/www.moj.go.jp\/ENGLISH\/<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [55]<\/a> Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau. (2009). Press Release on the Number of Recognized Refugees in 2008<\/em>. Retrieved November 1, 2009, from the Ministry of Justice website: http:\/\/www.moj.go.jp\/PRESS\/090130-1.html<\/a><\/p>\n

                          [56]<\/a> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (1992). Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.<\/em> Retrieved November 1, 2009, from the UNHCR website: http:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/publ\/PUBL\/3d58e13b4.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

                          ENDS<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                          The Government of Japan comes under review this month in Geneva by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. I was invited to submit a chapter for a report to the UN by the NGO Solidarity with Migrants Japan (SMJ) on how Japan is doing with enforcing it. <\/p>\n

                          NGO Report Regarding the Rights of Non-Japanese Nationals, Minorities of Foreign Origins, and Refugees in Japan.<\/p>\n

                          Prepared for the 76th United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Session February 2010
                          \nCompiled and published by: Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ)<\/p>\n

                          CHAPTER 2 Race and Nationality-based Entrance Refusals at Private and Quasi-Public Establishments By Debito Arudou. Page 7<\/p>\n

                          As I conclude:<\/p>\n

                          “In conclusion, the situation is that in Japan, racial discrimination remains unconstitutional and unlawful under the ICERD, yet not illegal. Japan has had more than a decade since 1996 to pass a criminal law against RD. Its failure to do so can only be interpreted as a clear violation of ICERD Article 2(1): \u201cStates Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay [emphasis added] a policy of eliminating racial discrimination.\u201d We urge the Committee to make the appropriate advisements to the Japanese government to pass a law against racial discrimination without any further delay.”<\/p>\n

                          Enjoy. Let’s see how the UN and GOJ respond. Here’s how the GOJ responded in 2008 — read and guffaw at their claim that they have taken “every conceivable measure to fight against racial discrimination”.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[28,18,34,5,4,7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6000","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-anti-discrimination-templates","category-academia","category-exclusionism","category-human-rights","category-japanese-government","category-united-nations"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6000","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6000"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6000\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6000"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6000"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.debito.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6000"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}