Forwarded by a friend. So much for the effectiveness of the US-VISIT system the current Japanese NJ fingerprinting regime is modeled upon. First the source of the article (the table of contents), then the article with pertinent sections underlined. The article, btw, has long been unavailable online at Asahi.com. No wonder. Which is why I had to wait until I got this source. Arudou Debito
AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO
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DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS
November 21, 2007
(1) US needs to see progress in nuclear, abduction issues for N. Korea delisting: Bush [Sankei] 2
(2) Fukuda diplomacy takes first step toward “synergy”: Premier Wen reacts favorably [Asahi] 3
(3) Leaders of Japan, China, South Korea play up friendly mood, laying aside pending issues [Nikkei] 4
(4) Nukaga treated by Mitsubishi [Akahata] 6
(5) Editorial: Do we want to entrust the compilation of the state budget to Finance Minister Nukaga? [Asahi] 6
(6) Ruling, opposition parties to find way to reach agreement on bills [Asahi] 7
(7) US N-flattop unsettles local host communities [Tokyo Shimbun] 9
(8) US system of screening visitors: mistakes, contradictions found in 38% of those cited on monitoring list [Asahi] 10
(9) Policy watch: Face up to the economy slipping [Sankei] 11
(10) TOP HEADLINES 13
(11) EDITORIALS 13
(12) Political Cartoon 15
** Next Daily Summary will be issued on November 26. **
(8) US system of screening visitors: mistakes, contradictions found in 38% of those cited on monitoring list
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts)
November 19, 2007
Arriving foreign visitors form a long line at the immigration section at John F Kennedy Airport in New York to have their fingerprints taken from the index finger of each hand. Visitors have to wait for more than one hour when a number of flights arrive.
The US-visit system was introduced in 2004. The system is almost the same as Japan’s. Anna Hinken, an officer of the US Department of Homeland Security, proudly said: “We have rejected the entry of more than 2,000 persons who were considered a security risk since the system was introduced.”
But a US government agency poses questions about the system’s technology and credibility. This July, the US General Accounting Office criticized the US-visit system as seriously fragile in view of information control. He pointed out the possibility that personal data, including fingerprint data, might be altered or copied by someone from the outside due to insufficient security measures.
In September, an auditor of the Justice Department emphasized how inaccurate US blacklists are. The auditor said that as a result of a sampling check of the terrorism-affiliates included in a monitoring list, mistakes or contradictions were found in 38% of those checked, with the names of some terror suspects left out of the list or innocent persons appearing on it.
The monitoring list was compiled by integrating those of such government agencies as the FBI and the Transportation Security Administration, and the list is not open to the public. As of April this year, the number of those listed was 700,000. The number reportedly increases by 20,000 per month.
American Civil Liberties Union member Barry Steinhardt said: “There should not be so many terrorists. The list is unreliable. In addition, since the list is classified and not publicized, it is impossible to check how effectively it has worked to prevent terrorism.”
The monitoring list has also affected civic life. There are cases in which citizens unrelated to terrorism appeared on the list or in which a person who has the same family and personal name as a certain suspect was stopped at an airport security check.
The US-visit system also tends to give travelers an unpleasant impression about the nation.